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NOVEL THEORIES OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE
BASED UPON THE TOXICITY OF THE
SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT: URBAN
PSYCHOSIS, TELEVISION INTOXICATION,
AND BLACK RAGE
PATRICIA J. FALK*
Criminal defendants increasingly claim that their criminal behavior
was caused by social toxins that excuse or mitigate their guilt. In
this Article, Professor Falk demonstrates that these claims are not
aberrational doctrinal proposals, but rather are sophisticated
extensions of existing criminal doctrine commensurate with
scientific advancements. Unlike prevalent short-term causal
explanations for criminal behavior, these novel extensions serve to
elucidate long-term, diffuse effects of social toxins on the human
psyche. In so doing, they provide otherwise unavailable insight
into criminal behavior. Professor Falk urges the legal community
to meaningfully consider these valuable new windows into the
criminal mind, rather than fall prey to the common pitfall of
reflexive "abuse excuse" rhetoric.
INTRODUCTION ....................................... 733
I. THE CASES: URBAN PSYCHOSIS, TELEVISION
INTOXICATION, AND BLACK RAGE AS THEORIES OF
CRIMINAL DEFENSE ................................ 738
A. Urban Psychosis ............................. 738
1. Urban Psychosis .......................... 738
2. Urban Survival Syndrome ................... 740
B. Television Intoxication ......................... 742
1. Television Violence ........................ 742
2. Violent Pornography ....................... 746
* Assistant Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State
University. J.D., 1983, University of Nebraska-Lincoln; Ph.D. (psychology), 1988,
University of Nebraska-Lincoln. I wish to acknowledge with gratitude the financial
support of the Cleveland-Marshall Fund. I am also grateful to my colleagues Phyllis L.
Crocker, Jack A. Guttenberg, Gregory Mark, Lloyd B. Synder, and Victor L. Streib for
their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of this Article. Finally, I wish to thank my two
research assistants, Lisa P. Kirby and Kenneth C. Robling, for their tireless efforts.
HeinOnline  -- 74 N.C. L. Rev.  731 1995-1996
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
3. Violent Rock Lyrics ....................... 747
C. Black Rage ................................. 748
1. Racism Causing Mental Illness Simpliciter ...... 749
2. Specific Acts of Racism as Precipitating Events... 752
a. Racial Epithets ........................ 752
b. Racially-Discriminatory Conduct .......... 755
D. Conclusion ................................. 757
II. THE SOCIAL SCIENCE: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF
REAL-LIFE VIOLENCE, TELEVISION VIOLENCE,
AND RACISM ................................... 758
A. Urban Psychosis: The Effects of Real-Life Violence... 758
1. The Psychiatric Consequences of Violence: Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder .................. 759
2. The Psychological Consequences of Violence .... 762
3. Discussion .............................. 765
B. Television Intoxication: The Effects of Television
Violence .................................. 766
1. The Positive Correlation Between Television
Violence and Aggressive Behavior ............ 767
2. Causal Theories of Aggression ............... 768
3. The Voluntariness of Television Viewing ........ 771
4. Discussion .............................. 772
C. Black Rage: The Effects of Racism ............... 773
1. The Psychiatric, Psychological, and Medical
Consequences ............................ 774
2. Causal Theories of the Effects of Racism ....... 777
3. The Need for Additional Research and the
Role of Racism ........................... 779
4. Discussion .............................. 780
D. The Cumulative Impact of These Social Toxins ....... 780
E. Conclusion ................................. 781
III. URBAN PSYCHOSIS, TELEVISION INTOXICATION,
AND BLACK RAGE FIT WITHIN THE EXISTING STRUCTURE
OF CRIMINAL DOCTRINE .......................... 783
A. Guilt Determination: Exculpation and Mitigation ..... 784
1. The Insanity Defense: An Excuse Defense ...... 784
2. Diminished Capacity and Provocation:
Failure-of-Proof Defenses ................... 788
a. Diminished Capacity ................... 789
b. Provocation .......................... 791
3. Self-Defense: A Justification Defense .......... 794
B. Mitigation of Punishment ....................... 798
[Vol. 74732
HeinOnline  -- 74 N.C. L. Rev.  732 1995-1996
1996] NOVEL THEORIES OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE 733
1. Non-Capital Cases ........................ 799
2. The Death Penalty ........................ 800
C. Conclusion ................................. 801
IV. SOME POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THESE DEFENSES FOR
THE EVOLUTION OF CRIMINAL LAW: DIFFERENTIAL
IMPACT AND LONG-TERM, DEVELOPMENTAL
EXPLANATIONS OF CRIMINALITY .................... 802
A. The Social Toxins of Real-Life Violence, Television
Violence, and Racism Differentially Affect Individuals 802
B. The Need to Integrate Increasing Scientific Knowledge
Regarding the Causes of Criminal Behavior:
Long-Term, Developmental Explanations ........... 806
C. Conclusion ................................. 809
CONCLUSION ....................................... 810
INTRODUCTION
"Only by integrating scientific advancements with our
ideals of justice can law remain a part of the living fiber of
our civilization."'
In recent years, defendants have proffered a multitude of novel
theories of criminal defense in seeking to explain their criminal
behavior in terms of internal and external influences beyond their
control, including biological processes,' chemical reactions,3 intra-
psychic dynamics,4 social conditions,' and cross-cultural stresses.'
1. Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 494 (1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
2. See, e.g., Deborah W. Denno, Human Biology and Criminal Responsibility: Free
Will or Free Ride?, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 615 (1988); Marcia Baran, Comment, Postpartum
Psychosis: A Psychiatric Illness, A Legal Defense to Murder, or Both?, 10 HAMLINE J.
PUB. L. & POL'Y 121 (1989); Anne D. Brusca, Note, Postpartum Psychosis: A Way Out
for Murderous Moms?, 18 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1133 (1990); Marc C. Press, Note,
Premenstrual Stress Syndrome As a Defense in Criminal Cases, 1983 DUKE L.J. 176; Mark
Curriden, Guilty By Heredity?: His Lawyer Says It's in the Killer's Genes, NAT'L L.J., Nov.
7, 1994, at A12; Juan Williams, Violence, Genes, and Prejudice, DISCOVER, Nov. 1994, at
92.
3. See, eg., Martin J. Bidwill & David L. Katz, Injecting New Life Into an Old
Defense: Anabolic Steroid-Induced Psychosis as a Paradigm of Involuntary Intoxication,
7 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 1 (1989); Todd P. Myers, Halcion Made Me Do It
New Liability and a New Defense-Fear and Loathing in the Halcion Paper Chase, 62 U.
CIN. L. REV. 603 (1993).
4. See, e.g., Mary C. Bonnema, Comment, "Trance on Trial": An Exegesis of
Hypnotism and Criminal Responsibility, 39 WAYNE L. REV. 1299 (1993); Michael J.
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These novel defense theories have spawned a nationwide debate7 in
which rhetoric about the "abuse excuse"8 and apocalyptic predictions
Davidson, "Aces Over Eights"--Pathological Gambling as a Criminal Defense, ARMY
LAW., Nov. 1989, at 11.
5. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, "Rotten Social Background": Should the Criminal Law
Recognize a Defense of Severe Environmental Deprivation?, 3 LAW & INEQ. J. 9 (1985);
Abbe Smith, Criminal Responsibility, Social Responsibility, and Angry Young Men:
Reflections of a Feminist Criminal Defense Lawyer, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
433 (1994); Judd F. Snierson, Comment, Black Rage and the Criminal Law: A Principled
Approach to a Polarized Debate, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 2251 (1995); Kimberly M. Copp,
Note, Black Rage: The Illegitimacy of a Criminal Defense, 29 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 205
(1995); George Vuoso, Note, Background, Responsibility, and Excuse, 96 YALE L.J. 1661
(1987).
6. See, e.g., Ann T. Lam, Culture As a Defense: Preventing Judicial Bias Against
Asians and Pacific Islanders, 1 UCLA ASIAN AM. & PAC. ISLANDS L.J. 49 (1993); Note,
The Cultural Defense in the Criminal Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1293 (1986); Julia P. Sams,
Note, The Availability of the "Cultural Defense" as an Excuse for Criminal Behavior, 16
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 335 (1986); Spencer Sherman, Legal Clash of Cultures, NAT'L
L.J., Aug. 5, 1985, at 1.
7. The controversy surrounding these novel theories of defense is exemplified in
dualistic notions regarding the need to curb crime and the need to understand better the
genesis of criminal behavior. The American public, fed by the media, is more afraid of
violent crime and its consequences than at any time in the past. Rorie Sherman, Crime's
Toll on the U.S.: Fear, Despair and Guns, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 18, 1994, at Al. At the same
time, the polled public says that it has some sympathy for those claiming their crimes
resulted from forces beyond their control. For instance, a National Law Journal poll found
that a majority of those surveyed believed that television violence encourages crime; 79%
of women and 56% of men believed that pornography encourages violence against women;
and 49% believed that the black rage defense would be compelling in a criminal
prosecution (68% of blacks and 45% of whites). Id.; see also Black Rage Defense Gets
Backing in Poll, RECORD (Northern N.J.), Apr. 11, 1994, at A05 (noting findings of a
national survey of attitudes toward the black rage defense; nearly half of those polled
considered it a "compelling" defense); Stephanie B. Goldberg, Fault Lines, A.B.A. J., June
1994, at 40 (stating that Americans are becoming more interested in the psychological
makeup of the citizenry; talk shows abound regarding individuals' bizarre and unusual
behavior).
8. Alan Dershowitz defines the "abuse excuse" as "the legal tactic by which criminal
defendants claim a history of abuse as an excuse for violent retaliation." ALAN M.
DERSHOWITZ, THE ABUSE EXCUSE 3 (1994); see also Goldberg, supra note 7, at 44 ("It's
scary to think of a society in which anyone can raise some kind of plausible excuse for
their behavior and the courts will take it seriously."); Niko Price, The "Abuse Excuse":
Threat to Justice?; More and More Lawyers Using Trauma as Defense to Crimes, THE
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, May 31, 1994, at 3 (laying partial blame for the abuse excuse
defense on "two decades of pop psychology and afternoon talk shows that have convinced
society ... that there is an explanation-and possibly a justification-for almost any act");
Margot Slade, I am a Victim of (Fill in Blank) and Couldn't Help Myself. Legal Defenses
Put Blame on Syndromes, MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL STAR TRIB., May 21, 1994, at 4A
(arguing that the impact of the abuse excuse may be overstated-the insanity defense is
invoked in less than 1% of all felony pleas and is successfully invoked in only 25% of
those cases); Nightline: Is Abuse an Excuse? (ABC television broadcast, Feb. 4, 1994)
(discussing various cases implicating the abuse excuse) [hereinafter Nightline] (transcript
[Vol. 74
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of the demise of our criminal justice system9 have, overshadowed
meaningful consideration and reasoned analysis. Instead of cavalierly
rejecting these theories of criminal defense, we should examine with
care the claims made by these defendants, especially since many of
the implicated defendants are from minority groups and politically
powerless segments of society. These defenses, and those which will
surely follow, present a challenge to our system of justice. They are
one avenue through which we must continually adjust the values of
our nation to the current realities of our lives.
This Article focuses on one subset of this burgeoning class of
defenses: those based upon the central premise that the defendant's
criminal conduct was caused, or significantly influenced, by his
exposure to social environmental factors or, if you will, toxins
affecting his mental functioning. ° While a wide panoply of toxins
exist within the fabric of our social environment," three of the most
pervasive and damaging are: the daily reality of violence in our
nation's homes, neighborhoods, and communities; the incessant
barrage of graphic depictions of violence presented in the media; and
the persistence, if not resurgence, of racism despite the guarantee of
legal equality. It is not a coincidence, then, that defendants have
raised defenses based upon these same three social conditions-urban
psychosis, television intoxication, and black rage.
The notion that social conditions influence criminal behavior is
certainly not new; these defenses are consonant with a broad
literature documenting the effects of adverse social conditions on the
on file with author).
9. See, eg., Julie Gannon Shoop, Criminal Lawyers Develop 'Urban Psychosis'
Defense, TRIAL, Aug. 1993, at 12, 13 ("Critics caution that the urban psychosis defense
could potentially exempt thousands of violent urban offenders from punishment.").
10. I borrow the term "toxin" from James Garbarino:
When I use the term "socially toxic environment" I mean to suggest that the
social context of children, the social world in which they live, has become
poisonous to their development. I offer it as a parallel to the environmental
movement's analysis of the physical toxicity as a threat to human well being.
James Garbarino, Growing Up in a Socially Toxic Environment: Life for Children and
Families in the '90s, 42 NEB. SYMP. MOTIVATION 6 (1995) [hereinafter Garbarino, Growing
Up]; see also JAMES GARBARINO, RAISING CHILDREN IN A SOCIALLY TOXIC ENVIRON-
MENT (1995) (discussing the theory of social toxicity in greater detail).
11. Garbarino, Growing Up, supra note 10, at 6. Garbarino elaborated:
And what are the social equivalents of lead and smoke in the air, PCBs in the
water, and pesticides in the food chain? I think they include violence, poverty
and other economic pressures, depression, trauma, despair, nastiness, and
alienation. These are the forces abroad in the land that contaminate children and
youth. These are the elements of social toxicity.
ma at 6-7.
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incidence of crime. 2  However, these defenses are innovative
because they transcend generalized theories of systemic influences and
provide more sophisticated and specific articulations of the impact of
discrete social toxins on mental health and criminality.
Scientific advances have laid the foundation for the articulation
of these innovative defense theories by elucidating the effects of social
toxins on some forms of mental functioning relevant to the criminal
law. One of the most significant developments, in this respect, has
been the mental health community's recognition that environmental
stressors can cause mental illness. In 1980, the American Psychiatric
Association included within its diagnostic lexicon a category of mental
illness, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), which results from
exposure to traumatic environmental events such as war. 3 Social
scientists have complemented the psychiatric literature by empirically
documenting the effects of adverse social influences on psychological
functioning, particularly developmental processes.
The defense theories of urban psychosis, television intoxication,
and black rage engender a plethora of complex and thorny issues.
The modest goal of this Article is to move beyond the "abuse excuse"
rhetoric toward a more coherent understanding of these theories of
defense. The Article begins that difficult process by collecting the
relevant cases, reviewing briefly the corresponding social science
literature, examining relevant criminal doctrine, and exploring
preliminarily some of the policy implications of these theories for the
evolution of criminal law.
Part I assesses the "state of the art" with respect to the legal
system's reception of urban psychosis, television intoxication, and
black rage as theories of defense. 4 It collects and analyzes the
12. See, e.g., NORVALL MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1982). Morris
writes:
Hence, at first blush, it seems a perfectly legitimate correlational and, I submit,
causal inquiry, whether psychosis, or any particular type of psychosis, is more
closely related to criminal behavior than, say, being born to a one-parent family
living in welfare in a black inner-city area. And there is no doubt of the
empirical answer. Social adversity is grossly more potent in its pressure toward
criminality, certainly toward all forms of violence and street crime as distinct
from white-collar crime, than is any psychotic condition. As a factual matter, the
exogenous pressures are very much stronger than the endogenous.
Id at 60-61.
13. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL 247-51
(3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter DSM-III]. "PTSD is among the few psychiatric disorders listed
in the DSM-III that are defined in part by the environment." Ralph Slovenko, Foreword
to D.B. SCRIGNAR, POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER vii, Viii (1984).
14. See infra notes 18-161 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 74
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available case law implicating these defenses with special emphasis on
both the social science proffered by the defendants and the variety of
doctrinal niches into which these defense theories fit. This analysis of
the cases demonstrates that defendants did not proffer these theories
as independent, free-standing defenses, or new doctrinal appurte-
nances, but used them as causative explanations to support existing
categories of defense and mitigation.
Part II provides an overview of the underlying scientific foun-
dations of these defense theories by surveying the social science
literature on the psychological effects of real-life violence, television
violence, and racism." While the degree of theoretical and empirical
support for the three defenses varies, sufficient social science exists in
each area to meet threshold evidentiary requirements.
Part III explores whether these defenses fit within the existing
structure of criminal jurisprudence. 6 It concludes that urban
psychosis, television intoxication, and black rage are merely modem
variations on established doctrinal themes that have evolved
throughout the history of criminal law. With little substantive
innovation or expansion, these theories may be accommodated within
the defense categories of insanity, diminished capacity, provocation,
and self-defense, and may be used as mitigating factors in punishment
determinations.
Finally, Part IV examines some of the policy implications of these
theories of defense that derive from two aspects of the social science
literature. 7 First, the social toxins of real-life violence, media
violence, and racism, while pervasive in society, affect individuals
differently such that only some persons are so gravely influenced that
mental illness or psychological dysfunction results. Second, the effects
of these social toxins require an examination of more long-term and
diffuse developmental processes rather than immediate and discrete
cause-and-effect relationships.
15. See infra notes 161-278 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 279-378 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 379-406 and accompanying text.
HeinOnline  -- 74 N.C. L. Rev.  737 1995-1996
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
I. THE CASES: URBAN PSYCHOSIS, TELEVISION INTOXICATION,
AND BLACK RAGE AS THEORIES OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE
A. Urban Psychosis
Why would one child kill another over a piece of clothing?
Well, Felicia Morgan's attorney says it was the stress of
growing up in the inner city.18
Defendants in four cases, all unreported, have utilized urban
psychosis or a variation thereof as a theory of defense. In two of
these cases, the defendants employed urban psychosis per se, claiming
that the experience of violence in their lives caused them to suffer
from mental illness which, in turn, materially contributed to their
subsequent criminal behavior. In the other two cases, involving a
variation of urban psychosis called "urban survival syndrome," the
defendants claimed that living in a violent, urban environment
induced in them a mindset of heightened fear and danger.19
1. Urban Psychosis'
The first case utilizing the theory of urban psychosis as a defense
concerned Felicia Morgan, a Milwaukee teenager, who shot and killed
another teenager when the latter refused to surrender possession of
a leather coat.2" Morgan used urban psychosis to support an insanity
defense. Robin Sheliow, Morgan's attorney, argued that her client's
"traumatic childhood in a violent inner-city home and neighborhood
created in her the urban counterpart of the post-traumatic stress
disorders that affected some Vietnam veterans."'  At the sanity
18. 20/20: An Excuse to Kill (ABC television broadcast, July 16, 1993) [hereinafter
20/20] (transcript on file with author).
19. See Price, supra note 8, at 3.
20. This term was coined by Robin Shellow, the attorney representing Felicia Morgan.
Shoop, supra note 9, at 12.
21. For reports of this unpublished case, see Shoop, supra note 9, at 12; Junda Woo,
Urban Trauma Mitigates Guilt, Defenders Say, WALL. ST. J., Apr. 27, 1993, at B1; Rogers
Worthington, 'Urban Psychosis' Rejected as Slaying Defense, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 5, 1992, at
8; Sonya Live (CNN television broadcast, Sept. 16, 1993) (transcript on file with author);
20/20, supra note 18.
22. Worthington, supra note 21, at 8. According to one news report, Morgan had a
nightmarish childhood:
At home, her parents threatened each other with guns, and her mother once held
her at knifepoint. Her mother and grandparents beat her regularly. Violence
was everywhere in her urban Milwaukee neighborhood. At 12, she was raped by
a landlord. By the time she was 17, several young relatives and friends had died
[Vol. 74738
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phase of the trial, two expert witnesses testified regarding Morgan's
mental state.3 Charles Ewing asserted that Morgan's condition was
brought about by severe physical and mental abuse from her mother.
James Garbarino testified about the deleterious effects of being the
victim of and/or witness to violence on a daily basis. 4 Morgan was
convicted' and sentenced to life in prison for armed homicide,
armed robbery, and other charges. The judge ruled that Morgan
would be eligible for parole in the minimum time-thirteen years and
four months, rather than the sixty years requested by the
prosecution.26 On appeal, Morgan is challenging the judge's decision
to admit evidence of urban psychosis only at the insanity stage rather
than the guilt-determination phase of the trial.'
The second case raising a defense based on urban psychosis
involved thirty-year-old Turhan Taylor.' Taylor grew up in a
violent family in a tough neighborhood in Milwaukee. He had been
abused as a child, sexually assaulted as a youth, and gang-raped in
prison.29 During a flashback to the gang-rape, Taylor stabbed a
sexual partner to death.3" In addition to urban psychosis, Taylor also
claimed that he had rape-trauma syndrome.3' After the judge ruled
that evidence of Taylor's PTSD was admissible at the guilt phase of
the trial,3 2 the prosecutor reduced the charge and Taylor pleaded
violently on the streets.
Shoop, supra note 9, at 12.
23. Under Wisconsin law, insanity defense trials are bifurcated. In the first phase,
guilt is determined; in the second phase, the jury considers the issue of insanity. WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 971.165 (West 1985 & Supp. 1994).
24. 20/20, supra note 18.
25. The jury reached a verdict in less than three hours. Worthington, supra note 21,
at 8. According to Shellow, two of the twelve jurors believed the argument regarding
urban psychosis. Woo, supra note 21, at B7.
26. Shoop, supra note 9, at 12. Shellow credited the introduction of information about
urban psychosis as being responsible for the relatively early parole date. Ia
27. Id.; Woo, supra note 21, at B7. Shellow claimed that Morgan did not have the
intent to kill, thereby reducing the severity of the crime, and that expert testimony at the
guilt phase would have assisted the jury in making that determination. Brief for
Defendant-Appellant at 7, State v. Morgan (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (No. 93-2611-CR) (on file
with author).
28. For reports of this unpublished case, see Shoop, supra note 9, at 13; Woo, supra
note 21, at B1.
29. Shoop, supra note 9, at 13; Woo, supra note 21, at B1.
30. Woo, supra note 21, at B1.
31. I&
32. The judge analogized the introduction of information of PTSD in Taylor's case to
the introduction of similar evidence in cases involving battered women or children. Shoop,
supra note 9, at 13.
739
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guilty to reckless homicide.3 Thus, Taylor succeeded where Morgan
failed, although Taylor used urban psychosis to mitigate his guilt
rather than attempting to excuse it."
2. Urban Survival Syndrome"5
The first case utilizing urban survival syndrome involved an
eighteen-year-old black youth, Daimion Osby, who shot and killed
two young men during a confrontation in a parking lot after a long-
running feud between them.36 One week before the shooting, the
two victims had threatened Osby with a shotgun. Osby used urban
33. Id. Reckless homicide is Wisconsin's statutory equivalent to manslaughter. Id.
"Whoever recklessly causes the death of another human being under circumstances which
show utter disregard for human life is guilty of a Class B felony." Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 940.02(1) (West Supp. 1994).
34. Urban psychosis was also publicized as the defense theory in a case involving Lisa
Connelly and six other teenagers who lured a 20-year-old acquaintance to a rock quarry
and killed him. Lawyer mulls 'urban psychosis' as defense in Florida murder case,
HOUSTON POST, Sept. 3,1993, at A28; Suspect Plans Urban Psychosis Defense, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, Sept. 2, 1993, at B4 [hereinafter Suspect Plans]; April Witt, Violence Cited as
Defense in Murder, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 1, 1993, at 1BR ("Murder suspect Lisa
Connelly, 19, might have been so numbed by rampant violence in South Florida and in her
own life that she wasn't responsible for her actions when she allegedly helped kill Bobby
Kent, her attorney argued Tuesday.").
Unfortunately, since little additional information exists regarding this case, it is
unclear whether Connelly actually raised urban psychosis to support her defense at trial.
One article reported that Connelly's attorney "lost his attempt to allow expert testimony
at trial that Connelly suffers from a 'dependent personality disorder,' which diminished her
ability to formulate the intent to commit murder." Charles E. Hecker, Judge Confession
Stands in Kent Case, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 26, 1994, at 2BR. Ellis Rubin, the attorney in
several television-intoxication cases, is quoted as saying that he did not think that the
defense would be successful in the Connelly case. Suspect Plans, supra, at B4.
35. David Bays, one defendant's court-appointed attorney, coined this term after
consulting a race-relations expert he heard on talk radio. Lori Montgomery, 'Urban
Survival Syndrome' Attorneys Say Client Shot Pair Because of Fear Blacks Have of Other
Blacks, MORNING NEWS TRIB. (Tacoma, Wash.), Oct. 24, 1994, at D5. Bays defined the
syndrome as "the fear that black people have of other black people ... ." Mistrial
Declared in 'Urban Survival Syndrome' Case, AUSTIN AM.-STATEsMAN, Apr. 21,1994, at
B2. According to another news report, the syndrome is "[n]ot a mental illness, but an
intense fear, a heightened sense of danger created in urban areas where the cops don't
come when you call and you better look out for yourself." Lori Montgomery, Murder
Defence to Rest on 'Urban Survival Syndrome'; Explosive Argument Claims Dangers Justify
Gunning Down Neighbors, EDMONTON J., Oct. 24, 1994, at A6.
36. Jeri Clausing, Mistrial in 'Urban Survival' Case, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 21, 1994,
at A13. For other news coverage of this unreported case, see Courtland Milloy, Self-
Defense Goes Insane in the City, WASH. POST, May 18, 1994, at D01; Lori Montgomery,
Murder Defense Based on "Urban SurvivaL" HOUSTON CHRON., Oct. 24, 1994, at A15;
Dateline" Profile: Urban Survival Defense Being Used in Controversial Murder Trial in
Fort Worth, Texas (NBC television broadcast, Oct. 19, 1994) [hereinafter Dateline]
(transcript on file with author).
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survival syndrome to furnish an underpinning for his claim of self-
defense. During his first trial, Osby's counsel called an urban crime
witness.37 The first trial resulted in a hung jury; the black foreperson
thought that Osby had killed in self-defense.3 In a subseqent retrial
in which "[t]he controversial defense was not used as prominently,"39
Osby was convicted of murder.' Since the prosecutors had decided
before trial not to seek the death penalty, Osby received an automatic
life sentence.4'
A second urban-survival-syndrome case involved Torino
Roosevelt Boney, a nineteen-year-old who shot a twenty-year-old man
in the head after they bumped into each other in a food court at
Union Station in Washington, D.C.42 Boney's attorney and a social
worker attributed his violent reaction to this minor incident to urban
survival syndrome, which they defined as a "defensive mind-set
prevalent in tough, inner-city neighborhoods."'43 Boney's counsel
asserted that "poor urban areas foster a 'cycle of violence and despair'
among young black men, and 'a look, a bump or a glance leads to
extreme violence.' "' Boney received a ten-year minimum sentence
for the killing.45 Due to the limited media reports, the precise
function of urban survival syndrome in this case is unclear.
37. Milloy, supra note 36, at DO. The expert witness, Jared Taylor, testified about
black-on-black crime. Id.
38. Clausing, supra note 36, at A13.
39. Urban Survival Defendant Convicted, UPI, Nov. 11, 1994, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, UPI File. But see Dateline, supra note 36 ("Damian Osby's defense has a
new angle for the retrial. In addition to urban survival syndrome, his attorney will now
argue that Osby suffered from something usually associated with war veterans, post-
traumatic stress disorder.").
40. Urban Survival Defendant Convicted, supra note 39.
41. Id.
42. Greg Seigle, Union Station Killer Gets 10-Year Minimum, WASH. TIMES, June 10,
1994, at C10.
43. Id.
44. Id-
45. Id.
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B. Television Intoxication46
Ronny Zamora was created by television. Win or lose,
society was going to have to face it.47
Defendants in six criminal cases, three unpublished, have claimed
that media violence, in one form or another,48 affected their mental
functioning and thereby played a causal role in their criminal
behavior. In three of these cases, the defendants argued that their
exposure to media violence caused them to become legally insane.
Defendants in two cases asserted that the impact of media violence
was relevant to the broader question of moral culpability vis-a-vis the
imposition of the death penalty; one defendant made both arguments.
1. Television Violence
The first case utilizing television intoxication as a theory of
defense is Florida v. Zamora.49 In that case, fifteen-year-old Ronny
Zamora and an accomplice broke into an elderly neighbor's house
where they found some money and a gun.50 The neighbor returned
home while the two teenagers were in the house and immediately
recognized Zamora; Zamora shot and killed her.5' At trial,52
Zamora was represented by Ellis Rubin,53 who asserted an insanity
46. Ellis Rubin coined this term in his defense of Ronny Zamora. ELLIS RUBIN &
DARY MATERA, "GET ME ELLIS RUBIN!": THE LIFE, TIMES, AND CASES OF A
MAVERICK LAWYER 39 (1989).
47. Id. at 40.
48. Three cases involved television violence, two pertained to violent pornography,
and one concerned violent rock lyrics, specifically "gangsta rap." All six cases are
examined in this section.
49. Florida v. Zamora (Dade County Cir. Ct. 1977), aff'd, 361 So. 2d 776 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied, 372 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 1979); see also TV on Trial (PBS
television broadcast, Mar. 21, 1978) (tape on file with author) (covering the case in a two-
hour television special). One news broadcast reported on an unidentified case that may
have been Zamora: "One man even told a jury that he killed two people because T.V.
made him do it. The jury found him guilty anyway, but some people think that he had a
point." Frontline: Does TV. Kill? (PBS television broadcast, Jan. 10, 1995) [hereinafter
Frontline] (transcript on file with author).
50. Zamora v. Wainwright, 637 F. Supp. 439, 440 (S.D. Fla. 1986), affd sub nom.
Zamora v. Dugger, 834 F.2d 956 (11th Cir. 1987).
51. Id. at 440-41.
52. Ironically, the Zamora case was the first televised trial in Florida during a one-year
experimental period. The irony of televising a trial in which television was itself on trial
was not lost on commentators. See, e.g., TV on Trial, supra note 49.
53. For a discussion of the case by Rubin, see RUBIN & MATERA, supra note 46, at
23-65.
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defense. Rubin argued that Zamora had become involuntarily
subliminally intoxicated by violent television programming.54 To
support the insanity defense, Rubin attempted to introduce two kinds
of expert testimony. First, he called a psychiatrist who stated that
Zamora was insane in the two or three seconds when he actually shot
the victim.' Rubin also sought to introduce the testimony of a
psychologist who was an expert on the effects of television violence
upon children. The court refused to allow this testimony, stating that
it did not support an insanity defense and was, therefore, irrelevant.56
Zamora was convicted in record time 7 and sentenced to life
imprisonment for the murder.5 8
Perhaps more than for the trial itself, Zamora is noteworthy for
the considerable subsequent litigation it spawned. In state courts,
Rubin appealed on the ground that the trial court erred in excluding
the expert testimony on the negative effects of violent television on
children, but the Florida Court of Appeals rejected the appeal.59
Zamora thereafter retained new counsel and appealed, arguing
ineffective assistance of counsel; this appeal was also denied.' After
exhausting the appellate process in Florida, Zamora mounted a
54. Zamora v. State, 361 So. 2d 776, 779 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied, 372
So. 2d 472 (Fla. 1979).
55. td. at 780. For an account by the psychiatrist, Michael Gilbert, of his testimony
in Zamora, see Donna Gehrke, Trial Over But Ordeal Continues, TV Intoxication Murder
Case Still Haunts Principals, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 3, 1989, at 1G. Gilbert claimed that
Zamora acted as the result of a conditioned reflex. Id
56. Zamora, 361 So. 2d at 779. For the portion of the trial transcript relating to the
court's decision to disallow this testimony, see JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER,
SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 446-52 (1994). Rubin and Matera
elaborate on the exclusion:
He refused to consider their studies or hear their testimony concerning the
damaging effects of television violence on children. Judge Baker's rationale was
that the expert testimony had to be restricted to Ronny, and could not be
extended to children in general. Such a decree would make most respected
researchers of any topic insist that Judge Baker was legally insane. Imagine
trying to prove that cigarettes cause cancer, and being restricted to one single
smoker?
RUBIN & MATERA, supra note 46, at 51. The judge also refused to admit 78 scientific
studies and published stories regarding the effect of television violence on children. Id.
57. The jury took less than two hours to return a guilty verdict. Gehrke, supra note
55.
58. Zamora, 361 So. 2d at 778. Zamora received additional sentences for burglary,
robbery, and the possession of a firearm. Id
59. Id at 779.
60. Zamora v. State, 422 So. 2d 325 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
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habeas corpus challenge in the federal courts,6' again claiming, inter
alia, that he had been denied effective assistance of counsel because
Rubin had tried the unlikely defense of television intoxication.62
The federal courts were not sympathetic to this argument; they noted
that little defense was possible and concluded that Rubin had done
the best he could.6' These courts also noted that Rubin's use of a
television intoxication defense had permitted the introduction of
evidence of Zamora's unfortunate background, possibly engendering
jury sympathy.64
The final piece of litigation resulting from this case was a civil
suit' by Zamora and his parents against the three major television
networks.66 The federal district court dismissed the suit, relying on
the importance of the First Amendment:
One day, medical or other sciences with or without the
cooperation of programmers may convince the EC.C. or the
Courts that the delicate balance of First Amendment rights
should be altered to permit some additional limitations in
programming. The complaint before the Court in no way
justifies such a pursuit.67'
61. Zamora v. Wainwright, 610 F. Supp. 159 (S.D. Fla. 1985); Zamora v. Wainwright,
637 F. Supp. 439 (S.D. Fla. 1986), affd sub nom. Zamora v. Dugger, 834 F.2d 956 (11th
Cir. 1987).
62. Zamora, 610 F. Supp. at 160.
63. Zamora, 834 F.2d at 959; Zamora, 637 F. Supp. at 442-43.
64. Zamora, 834 F.2d at 959; Zamora, 637 F. Supp. at 442.
65. Zamora v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 480 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
66. In a number of other civil cases, plaintiffs sued media defendants for harm
allegedly occasioned by violent television programming or movies; in none of these cases
has recovery been permitted. See, e.g., Bill v. Superior Court for City and County of San
Francisco, 187 Cal. Rptr. 625 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (plaintiff sued movie's producers when
she was shot following its showing); Olivia N. v. National Broadcasting Co., 141 Cal. Rptr.
511 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 (1978) (plaintiffs alleged the "artificial
rape" of their daughter was caused in part by the broadcast of a television movie depicting
a similar rape); Yakubowicz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 536 N.E.2d 1067 (Mass. 1989)
(plaintiff sued after decedent was fatally stabbed by a patron who had just seen a violent
movie).
For additional discussion of civil litigation related to television or media violence, see
E. Barret Prettyman, Jr. & Lisa A. Hook, The Control of Media-Related Imitative Violence,
38 FED. COMM. L.J. 317 (1987); Julia W. Schlegel, The Television Violence Act of 1990:
A New Program for Government Censorship?, 46 FED. COMM. L.J. 187 (1993); Emily
Campbell, Comment, Television Violence: Social Science vs. The Law, 10 LOY. L.A. ENT.
L.J. 413 (1990); Stephen J. Kim, Comment, "Viewer Discretion Is Advised": A Structural
Approach to the Issue of Television Violence, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 1383 (1994); Laura A.
Lyon, Comment, Subliminal Song Lyrics as Product Defects, 96 DICK. L. REV. 125 (1991).
67. Zamora, 480 F. Supp. at 206-07.
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In a second case, State P. Molina,68 the defendant, also
represented by Rubin, pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity based
upon a theory of television intoxication. After twenty-one-year-old
Molina watched a movie entitled "Love at First Bite," he held down
a ten-year-old girl while her sixteen-year-old step-brother stabbed and
shot her to death.69 Rubin maintained that the social science basis
of the defense had improved since the Zamora case,70 but the jury
rejected Molina's insanity defense,7' and the judge sentenced him to
life imprisonment.72
In a more recent case, State v. Quillen,73 the seventeen-year-old
defendant and an accomplice bludgeoned a man to death during a
burglary. Quillen attempted to withdraw his guilty plea to first-degree
murder, claiming that his attorneys had failed to apprise him fully of
his defense options, including the possibility of an insanity defense
based upon television intoxication.74 Defense counsel had contacted
an expert regarding this theory of defense, but that expert was "not
comfortable"'75 with an insanity defense.76 The trial court rejected
68. State v. Molina, No. 84-2314B (11th Judicial Dist., Fla. 1984). For brief discussions
of this case, see Juliet L. Dee, Media Accountability for Real-Life Violence: A Case of
Negligence or Free Speech?, 37 J. CoMM. 106, 111 (1987); Campbell, supra note 66, at 437
n.121; Lyon, supra note 66, at 134-35.
69. Dee, supra note 68, at 111.
70. Id. "Rubin said that since the Zamora trial, there had been 'thousands' of studies
on television violence, including the 1982 National Institute of Mental Health report,
which, according to Rubin asserts 'a causal connection between television violence and
aggressive conduct of viewers, especially teenagers.' " 1d. (citations omitted).
71. The jury was only out for several hours. Id. However, the prosecutor noted that
"Molina came 100 giant steps closer to linking TV and murder than Zamora did in the
sense that the 'TV intoxication' argument was not immediately thrown out by the judge."
Id
72. Lyon, supra note 66, at 135.
73. No. S87-08-0118, 1989 Del. Super. LEXIS 129, at *1 (Mar. 28, 1989).
74. Id. at *16.
75. I& The expert was Dr. Robert M. Liebert, a Professor of Psychology at the State
University of New York and a "recognized expert on the subject of the influence on
children of graphic depictions of violence on television and in movies." Id at *3-*4.
76. Several additional cases implicated the role of television in a less direct fashion.
For instance, one author reported that John W. Hinckley, Jr. had "spent countless hours
watching television, which he later said was a dangerous practice leading him to engage
in violent fantasies. He believed that these fantasies led him to collect handguns and to
shoot the President of the United States." Campbell, supra note 66, at 416. It is also
commonly known that Hinckley was heavily influenced by the movie "Taxi Driver." See,
e.g., Elise M. Whitaker, Pornographer Liability for Physical Harms Caused by Obscenity
and Child Pornography: A Tort Analysis, 27 GA. L. REV. 849, 880 (1993). In State v.
Moore, 150 S.E.2d 47, 268 N.C. 124 (N.C. 1966), the defendant claimed to have been half-
asleep in front of the television during a program depicting violent wildlife scenes. He was
awakened suddenly and committed a violent act. Id.
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Quillen's claims, holding that he had been fully apprised of all
available defense options, and that the evidence did not support a
plea of insanity.7
2. Violent Pornography
The defendants in two cases claimed that their viewing of violent
pornography played some causal role in their commission of violent
offenses against women. The first case involved Bobby Joe Long,78
a convicted serial killer whom Rubin represented during his senten-
cing hearing in 1986. Rubin offered evidence concerning the effects
of exposure to violent pornography at the sentencing phase to avoid
imposition of the death penalty.79 The jury rejected the argument
and sentenced Long to death.8°
In Schiro v. Clark,8' the defendant utilized social science on the
connection between violent pornography and subsequent criminal
behavior at both the guilt-determination and sentencing phases of the
case. At trial, he raised an insanity defense: "Schiro argued that he
was a sexual sadist and that his extensive viewing of rape pornography
and snuff films rendered him unable to distinguish right from
wrong., 82 On appeal, seeking habeas corpus relief, Schiro claimed
ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to present
sufficient evidence of mitigation during the death penalty phase of the
trial. In rejecting Schiro's claim, the court noted that his attorney had
attempted to present expert testimony on the connection between
violent pornography and criminal acts, but the trial court had rejected
it.' The federal court upheld the trial court's exclusion of this
77. No. S87-08-0118, LEXIS 129, at *16-*21.
78. For subsequent litigation in this case, see Long v. State, 517 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 1987),
cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1017 (1988); Long v. State, 610 So. 2d 1276 (Fla. 1992); CBS, Inc. v.
Cobb, 536 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
79. See Ron Hayes, Attorney Knows How to Represent Himself. Florida "Nympho
Case" is the Latest to Keep Ellis Rubin in the News, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 9, 1991, § 5, at 2. To
support his argument, Rubin relied upon a recently-issued report by U.S. Attorney
General Edwin Meese linking pornography and violence: " 'I said 'perhaps' a contributing
factor to his activity was pornography,' ... 'and you should take that into account. I
didn't say that he murdered because of pornography.' " Id.
80. Id.
81. 963 F.2d 962 (7th Cir. 1992), aff'd, 114 S. Ct. 783 (1994).
82. Id. at 971.
83. Id. at 971-72. Schiro's counsel presented testimony by Edward Donnerstein, a
preeminent expert on the connection between pornography and violence against women.
Id. An additional expert, Frank Osanka, testified that Schiro's viewing of pornography
from the age of six encouraged him to commit the violent acts at issue. Id. at 972. The
court also cited a book by Catharine A. MacKinnon on the same issue. Id. at 972 n.9
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testimony,84 reasoning that it could not allow the First Amendment
to prevent the state from banning pornography on the one hand and
yet recognize exposure to pornography as a criminal defense or death-
penalty mitigator on the other.85
3. Violent Rock Lyrics
Finally, in one case the defendant asserted that his behavior was
affected by violent music lyrics. Ronald Ray Howard, a nineteen-
year-old male, shot and killed a police officer86 while listening to
(citing CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARDS A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 195-
214 (1989)). Defense counsel sought to introduce this testimony either as evidence of
mental disease or, by analogy, intoxication, two mitigating factors under Indiana's death
penalty statute, IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9 (Burns Supp. 1995).
84. Schiro, 963 F.2d at 971-72. The Seventh Circuit wrote:
The troubling aspect of Schiro's defense is that his argument that pornography
reduced his capacity to understand the criminality of his conduct, if successful,
would not only excuse him from imposition of the death penalty but further
excuse him for his criminal conduct altogether on the basis that he was not guilty
by reason of insanity. Under Schiro's theory pornography would constitute a
legal excuse to violence against women.... It would be impossible to hold both
that pornography does not directly cause violence but criminal actors do, and that
criminal actors do not cause violence, pornography does. The result would be to
tell Indiana that it can neither ban pornography nor hold criminally responsible
persons who are encouraged to commit violent acts because of pornography!
The recognition in Hudnut that pornography leads to violence against women
does not require Indiana to establish a defense of insanity by pornography. In
Hudnut we said that pornographers may be liable for rape just as the instigator
of a riot could be liable for inciting that riot. Hudnut does not suggest that the
rioter or the rapist is not also culpable for his own conduct.
Id. at 972-73 (footnote and citations omitted).
85. While not raising a defense based on violent pornography, convicted serial killer
Ted Bundy "traced his legacy of serial murder to the influence of sexual violence in the
media." Janny Scott & John Dart, Bundy's Tape Fuels Dispute on Porn, Antisocial
Behavior, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1989, at 1.
86. For discussions of this unpublished case, see Michele Munn, Note, The Effects of
Free Speech. Mass Communication Theory and the Criminal Punishment of Speech, 21 AM.
J. CRIM. L. 433,476-78 (1994); Janet Elliott, Slain Trooper's Family Seeks Damages From
Rapper: Round 2 in Gangsta Rap Case, LEGAL TIMES, July 26, 1993, at 10; Chuck Phillips,
Rap Defense Doesn't Stop Death Penalty, L.A. TIMES, July 15, 1993, at Fl; Pamela Ward,
Howard Gets Death Sentence, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, July 15, 1993, at B1.
For other treatments of sexually-explicit or violent rock lyrics, see Steven E. Butler,
Note, The Recent Assault on Sexually Explicit Music Lyrics, 12 WHITTIER L. REV. 367
(1991); John W. Holt, Comment, Protecting America's Youth: Can Rock Music Lyrics Be
Constitutionally Regulated?, 16 J. CONTEMP. L. 53 (1990); Wendy B. Kaufmann, Note,
Song Lyric Advisories: The Sound of Censorship, 5 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 225
(1986); Jim McCormick, Comment, Protecting Children From Music Lyrics: Sound
Recordings and "Harmful to Minors" Statutes, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 679 (1993);
see also Harry Schiller, First Amendment Dialogue and Subliminal Messages, 11 REV. L.
& SOC. CHANGE 331 (1982-83) (discussing subliminal messages); Lyon, supra note 66
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"gangsta rap."'  At the sentencing phase of the case, Howard
introduced evidence regarding the influence of violent lyrics on his
behavior as one form of mitigating evidence.8 Howard's attorney
characterized him as a "rap addict":89 "Howard's background of
family problems, poverty, and gang activity contributed to a total
environment which, according to his attorney as well as modern
theories about the effects of mass communication, made him a more
vulnerable target for violent messages in the mass media."9 After
being deadlocked for five days and given an additional charge, the
jury sentenced Howard to death.91
C. Black Rage92
He seems to be a man whose bitterness and racial hostility
have turned into blasting powder which can be touched off by
a spark.93
The theory of black rage has been raised as a defense in a
number94 of cases, .although only three cases employed that par-
ticular terminology. Black rage cases may be further subdivided
depending upon the presence or absence of a precipitating event with
identified racial overtones. In three cases, defendants simply claimed
that racism caused them to suffer severe mental illness leading to their
criminal behavior. In five other cases, the defendants' criminal
(discussing subliminal song lyrics).
87. " 'Gangsta rap' is a subgenre of rap music that is characterized by descriptions of
the harsh urban conditions many young black males face today." Munn, supra note 86,
at 476.
88. Id. at 477.
89. Id.
90. It. at 477-78.
91. Id. at 478-79. The victim's wife filed a civil suit against the rock group and its
record company. Id. at 486.
92. This term comes from WILLIAM H. GRIER & PRICE M. COBBS, BLACK RAGE
(1968).
93. United States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923, 962 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1044 (1972).
94. It is impossible to tell how many cases involve defendants damaged in some way
by racism. I chose the following cases because they directly raised the issue of racism as
a causative factor, the defendant's mental illness had significant racial overtones, or the
event precipitating the defendant's criminal conduct was identified as related to racism.
Notably, in each of these cases implicating a black rage defense, the victim was non-black.
See generally Delgado, supra note 5, at 41 (discussing one attorney's use of black rage
defense); Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal
Theory and The Practice of Law, 11 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 369, 403-05 (1982-
83) (same).
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conduct was apparently triggered by a specific racial incident, such as
the use of a racial epithet and/or an act of discriminatory conduct,95
although the underlying premise was still that the defendants' mental
state was affected by the experience of racism.
1. Racism Causing Mental Illness Simpliciter
The earliest reported case utilizing a black rage theory of defense
was the 1846 case of Freeman v. People.96 Freeman was accused of
killing four members of a white family in a small town in upstate New
York.97 William Henry Seward defended Freeman9" by arguing
that mistreatment by a white society had rendered him insane:99
"Such a life, so filled with neglect, injustice, and severity,
with anxiety, pain, disappointment, solicitude, and grief,
would have its fitting conclusion in a madhouse," Seward
argued before the jury. "If it be true, as the wisest man of
inspired writers hast said, 'Verily, oppression maketh a wise
man mad,' what may we not expect it to do with a foolish,
ignorant, illiterate man!"'1"°
The jury rejected Freeman's insanity defense and convicted him.'0'
On appeal, the New York Supreme Court reversed the conviction for
various errors, including the trial court's inappropriate limitation of
expert testimony, and ordered a new trial." z Freeman died in jail
before retrial."°
95. See Goldberg, supra note 7, at 43 ("The [black rage] theory, according to Cobbs
.. is that 'in certain individuals, the right stimuli will release an uncontrollable amount
of rage.' The stimuli or 'rage button' is typically a devaluation or racial insult.").
96. Freeman v. People, 4 Denio 9 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1847); see also BENJAMIN F. HALL,
THE TRIAL OF WILLIAM FREEMAN FOR THE MURDER OF JOHN G. VAN NEST (1848)
(discussing the trial in detail).
97. Jonathan Tilove, Racism and Rage: Is a Lifetime of Prejudice a Defense for a
Moment of Murder?, STAR TRIB., July 6, 1994, at 10A.
98. lId Seward was a former governor and the future secretary of state under Lincoln;
the prosecutor was the Attorney General of New York-John Van Buren, the former
president's son. lI
99. ld. Apparently Freeman had been falsely convicted of stealing a horse when he
was 16 years old and sentenced to prison for five years. During that time, Freeman was
beaten over the head causing him to become almost completely deaf. Freeman became
obsessed with being repaid for his five years in prison. ld.
100. ld. Seward's argument was supported by John Austin, a Universalist minister, who
testified that blacks were the subject of unworthy prejudices. Id
101. Freeman v. People, 4 Denio 9, 11, 18 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1847).
102. Id. at 39-41.
103. Tilove, supra note 97, at 10A. Freeman's autopsy revealed that he had organic
brain disease. Id.
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A second case implicating a black rage theory of defense is
United States v. Robertson.1" After Robertson was found com-
petent to stand trial, he explicitly refused to invoke the insanity
defense, although considerable evidence demonstrated that he
suffered from some form of mental illness. °5 Robertson was
convicted of second-degree murder, among other crimes.' 6 The
case is of interest in this context for two reasons. First, Robertson's
crime and mental illness had extensive racial overtones; he is quoted
as saying:
If a black man kills a white man, it is not a crime. It is
getting the oppression off his neck. If a black man kills a
black man, it is murder. I was under a lot of pressure on
that day. The tension was due to the circumstances of mybirth.' °
104. 507 F.2d 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1974), supplemental op., 529 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(per curiam), appeal after remand, 430 F. Supp. 444 (D.D.C. 1977).
105. Id at 1149-52. Robertson believed that the insanity defense would "impugn the
credibility of his racial and political views." Id at 1158. " '[D]efendant's rejection of the
insanity defense was essentially an assertion of manhood by an intelligent person and
motivated by his rejection of the racial stereotype of "all angry Blacks are mentally ill." ' "
Robertson, 529 F.2d at 880 (quoting District Court Memorandum, reprinted and attached
as Appendix to Circuit opinion, 529 F.2d at 881).
106. Robertson, 507 F.2d at 1149.
107. Id. at 1154 (quoting from the report of one mental health professional). The court
summarized some of the other evidence as follows:
After shooting Aleshire [the white victim], Robertson raced down the middle of
the street, brandishing his pistol and cursing the "white sons-of-bitches." Seeing
a police officer, he shouted, "You are doing it; why can't I?" "Yes, I shot the
white honkey son-of-a-bitch. What are you all going to do about it?" A witness
who was taken to the police station with Robertson testified that he continued
to make such statements throughout the trip, saying, for example: "[a]ll of the
white sons of bitches need to be killed or shot. I had did [sic] my part and I
can't do anymore.... All the sons of bitches should be shot .... and that is the
problem there isn't enough of us doing this sort of thing."
Id at 1150-51 (footnotes omitted) (alterations in original).
For another possible case of black rage based on the defendants' characterization of
their crimes as part of a racial struggle, see Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983). In that
case, the defendants left the following note at the scene of the crime:
"Warning to the oppressive state. No longer will your atrocities and brutalizing
of black people be unpunished. The black man is no longer asleep. The
revolution has begun and the oppressed will be victorious. The revolution will
end when we are free. The Black Revolutionary Army. All power to the
people."
Id. at 943.
[Vol. 74
HeinOnline  -- 74 N.C. L. Rev.  750 1995-1996
1996] NOVEL THEORIES OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE 751
Second, the mental health experts could not agree on whether he was
legally insane. 8  On appeal, the D.C. Circuit, in an opinion
authored by Judge Bazelon, held that the trial judge1 9 should have
heard testimony both for and against the insanity defense and
remanded the case for supplementation." 1 Thereafter, Robertson
decided to assert the insanity defense, and the case was scheduled for
retrial solely on the issue of criminal responsibility." On the day
of retrial, Robertson changed his mind, again declining to assert an
insanity defense."' The trial court determined that it would not
raise the defense sua sponte and articulated a number of factors in
support of that decision."
Finally, in the case of Colin Ferguson, who was convicted of
killing six and wounding nineteen passengers on the Long Island Rail
Road, attorneys William Kunstler and Ronald Kuby publicized their
intention to use black rage as the basis for an insanity defense."4
Kunstler and Kuby claimed that Ferguson, who had a host of mental
problems, was pushed over the edge by the rampant racism which he
encountered after emigrating to the United States from Jamaica." 5
108. Robertson, 507 F.2d at 1154. Judge Bazelon also noted the cultural and racial bias
inherent in psychiatric practice, citing GRIER & COBBS, supra note 91. Id. at 1159 n.46.
109. The trial judge was black, a factor which figured in his decision not to raise the
insanity defense sua sponte. Id. at 1155.
110. Id. at 1158-61.
111. United States v. Robertson, 430 F. Supp. 444, 445 (D.D.C. 1977).
112. IL
113. Ild at 446-48.
114. For reports on this unpublished case, see Michael Alexander, Black Rage,
NEWSDAY, May 9, 1994, at B4; Michael Alexander, Kunstler Takes Over Defense in LIRR
Shooting, NEWSDAY, Mar. 16, 1994, at 26; Peter Marks, L.I.R.R. Case Again Raises Sanity
Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12,1994, at B1; Clarence Page, Plead "Black Rage" in a Forgiving
Age, ST. LOUIS DISPATCH, June 1, 1994, at 7B; Eric Pooley, Capitalizing on a Killer: A
Spurious "Black Rage" Defense, N.Y. MAG., Apr. 18, 1994, at 38; Tilove, supra note 96,
at 10A.
115. William Kunstler gave the following description of Ferguson:
Ferguson's rage was a catalyst for violence resulting from a preexisting mental
illness, most likely schizophrenia. It was a mental condition no different from the
battered-wife syndrome, posttraumatic stress disorder, or the child-abuse-
accommodation syndrome in that, in conjunction with mental illness, it gave rise
to terrible acts of violence. Ferguson, from a wealthy Jamaican family, had
attended private school, enjoyed many luxuries, and was never able to adjust to
the white racism that he found when he came to this country. He never
developed the defense mechanisms that American-born blacks are forced to
learn.
WILLIAM M. KUNSTLER & SHEILA ISENBERG, MY LIFE AS A RADICAL LAWYER 386
(1994); see also Jeffrey Rosen, The Trials of William Kunstler, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV.,
Sept. 18, 1994, at 16 (discussing Kunstler's history of representing "unpopular clients" and
his assertion that "black rage" is a real mental condition).
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Ferguson, who chose exclusively white, Asian or "Uncle Tom negro_"
victims, also reportedly made racial comments after the shooting."6
Kunstler and Kuby were denied the chance to assert the defense,
however: Ferguson fired his attorneys, represented himself,'" and
did not mount an insanity defense based upon black rage. Ferguson
was convicted and sentenced to more than 200 years in prison."'
He now plans to appeal the conviction on the insanity issue."'
2. Specific Acts of Racism as Precipitating Events
a. Racial Epithets
In Fisher v. United States,2" the black defendant, who worked
as a janitor at a library, learned that a white librarian had complained
about his work habits. 21  When Fisher confronted the librarian
about these statements, she called him "a black nigger.""a "This
made him angry-no white person, he claimed, had ever called him
that-and he struck her."' The librarian screamed; Fisher killed
her to stop her screaming.2 At trial, counsel did not raise an
insanity defense. Rather, he introduced evidence of Fisher's
psychopathic personality and apathetic reaction to emotional
situations and requested an instruction that the jury could consider
the "entire personality of the defendant, his mental, nervous,
emotional and physical characteristics"" to determine whether he
had sufficient premeditation and deliberation for first-degree mur-
der." The trial court refused the requested instruction."z  On
116. Tilove, supra note 96, at 10A.
117. John T. McQuiston, L.LR.R. Killer Plans Appeal Based on the Insanity Issue, N.Y.
TIMEs, Feb. 19, 1995, § 1, at 1.
118. John T. McQuiston, Rail Gunman to Spend Life Behind Bars, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar.
23, 1995, at B1.
119. McQuiston, supra note 113, at A46 (" 'He understands that black rage is no longer
an issue in this case,' Mr. Kunstler said, 'but he understands he can no longer reject the
issue of his sanity if he wants us to do the appeal.' ").
120. 328 U.S. 463 (1946), affirming 149 F.2d 28 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
121. Id. at 479.
122. Id.
123. Id
124. Id. Fisher claimed to have little memory of the actual killing: "Fisher was
curiously unconnected with the deed, unaware of what he had done." Id. at 481.
125. Fisher v. United States, 149 F.2d 28, 29 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
126. Id "[T]he defense takes the position that the petitioner is fairly entitled to be
judged as to deliberation and premeditation, not by a theoretical normality but by his own
personal traits." Fisher, 328 U.S. at 466.
127. Fisher, 149 F.2d at 29.
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appeal, the D.C. Circuit upheld the decision of the trial court, noting
that the requested instruction conflated the issues of insanity and lack
of premeditation." 8 In essence, the Court of Appeals rejected the
diminished capacity or partial responsibility defense based on mental
illness not amounting to insanity.29
The United States Supreme Court's opinion in Fisher is notewor-
thy for the variety of viewpoints it spawned. The majority held that
since Fisher's mental state did not amount to insanity, the trial court
correctly interpreted the law of the District of Columbia as precluding
a partial responsibility defense.3 ' Justice Frankfurter, in his dissent,
argued that the jury had been improperly instructed on premeditation
and provocation and, therefore, reversal was required.'3 ' As an
evidentiary matter, Frankfurter asserted that he did "not believe that
the facts warrant a finding of premeditation.' 32  In a separate
dissent, Justice Murphy contended that partial insanity was a viable
psychiatric concept and that it should be recognized by the courts. 33
Since Fisher was decided in 1946, it is hardly surprising that the jurists
had such a difficult time trying to decide the appropriate doctrinal
niche-partial responsibility, lack of premeditation, or provocation-in
which to place Fisher's claim.
Almost three decades after Fisher, another case from the District
of Columbia arose that arguably falls under the rubric of black rage,
although the actual defense theory used was "rotten social back-
128. Id
129. Id.
130. Fisher, 328 U.S. at 471.
131. Id. at 490 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). He wrote:
If their minds had been so focused, the jury might well have found that the
successive steps that culminated in Miss Reardon's death could not properly be
judged in isolation. They might well have found a sequence of events that
constituted a single, unbroken response to a provocation in which no forethought,
no reflection whatever, entered. A deed may be gruesome and not be
premeditated. Concededly there was no motive for the killing prior to the
inciting "you black nigger." The tone in which these words were uttered
evidently pulled the trigger of Fisher's emotions, and under adequate instructions
the jury might have found that what these words conveyed to Fisher's ears
unhinged his self-control.
Id. at 485 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Later in his opinion, Frankfurter asserted: "[T]he
jury ought not to have been left to founder and flounder within the dark emptiness of legal
jargon. The instructions to the jury on the vital issue of premeditation consisted of
threadbare generalities, a jumble of empty abstractions .... " Id. at 487 (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting). Justice Rutledge, in his separate dissent, agreed with Justice Frankfurter that
the jury instructions were inadequate. Id. at 495 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 486 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 491-92 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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ground." In United States v. Alexander,"M one black defendant,
Benjamin Murdock, shot and killed two white individuals after one of
them called him and his friends by a racial epithet.13 Murdock
presented an insanity defense, asserting that his overreaction to this
racial insult was the result of his conditioning and upbringing-that is,
his "rotten social background": 36
The thrust of Murdock's defense was that the environment
in which he was raised-his "rotten social back-
ground"-conditioned him to respond to certain stimuli in a
manner most of us would consider flagrantly inappropriate.
Because of his early conditioning, he argued, he was denied
any meaningful choice when the racial insult triggered the
explosion in the restaurant.1 37
Murdock also requested an instruction on diminished respon-
sibility.1 38  The jury rejected Murdock's insanity defense and con-
victed him of second-degree murder.'39 On appeal, the D.C. Circuit
upheld the conviction."4 In his dissenting opinion, Judge Bazelon
discussed the psychological and psychiatric underpinnings of Mur-
dock's defense at considerable length. He commented:
Murdock was strongly delusional, though not hallucinating
or psychotic; he was greatly preoccupied with the unfair
treatment of Negroes in this country, and the idea that racial
war was inevitable.... Since his emotional difficulties were
closely tied to his sense of racial oppression, it is probable
that when the Marine in the Little Tavern called him a
"black bastard" Murdock had an irresistible impulse to
shoot.14 1
134. 471 F.2d 923 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1044 (1972).
135. Id. at 928-29. "A racial epithet hurled at appellants by one of their victims
touched off an explosion of violence and bloodshed, an explosion that reverberates the
traumas of our entire society." Id. at 926. The defendant's real name was Murdock
Benjamin. Id. at 926 n.1.
136. Id. at 959 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 960 (Bazelon, J., dissenting). Murdock grew up in the Watts section of Los
Angeles, site of the notorious 1965 race riots. Id. at 957-58 (Bazelon, J., dissenting). For
a discussion of this defense in light of modem social science, see Delgado, supra note 5.
MONAHAN & WALKER, supra note 56, at 391, categorize this case as one involving the
influence of subculture on the defendant's behavior.
138. Alexander, 471 F.2d at 948-49.
139. Id. at 927.
140. Id. at 926.
141. Id. at 957 (Bazelon, J., dissenting). Judge Bazelon noted that Murdock might
continue to be dangerous given his racial hostility. Id. at 962 (Bazelon, J., dissenting). He
proposed four possible alternatives for dealing with Murdock's case: (1) limit the
responsibility defense to exclude Murdock and put him in jail; (2) allow the defense and
754 [Vol. 74
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In a case with facts strikingly similar to those in Fisher, the black
defendant in State v. Hall hit a white co-worker with a hammer after
the latter made "racial remarks."'42  The remarks were the cul-
mination of extensive and prolonged racially-motivated
harassment.43 At trial, Hall argued provocation to reduce the crime
from attempted murder to aggravated assault, but he was convicted
of the more serious offense."4 Hall appealed, claiming that the trial
court erred in failing to instruct on the lesser-included offense. 45
While the majority rejected Hall's claim for lack of sufficient
provocation, 4' the dissenting judge asserted that the trial court
should have given the instruction because the "evidence which was
adduced at trial showed a history of provocations and remarks
offensive to any person's sensitivity, the result of which when put
together can cause violent rage in an individual.' 147
b. Racially-Discriminatory Conduct
In State v. Lamar, several young black men were tried on charges
arising out of a high-school riot with substantial racial overtones; the
riot culminated in an altercation with the police."4' At trial, the
young men raised a number of defenses, including self-defense,
defense of others, duress, and mistake of fact. 49 To support these
defenses, the defendants presented the expert testimony of two
psychologists to the effect that they possessed a character trait known
as black rage, which "apparently causes blacks to react in a certain
way against white police officers because blacks judge the actions of
a police officer in a manner different from others, thereby allegedly
rendering reasonable their actions in this specific case.""50 Three of
the five defendants were convicted of at least one charge. On appeal,
the defendants claimed that the trial court had erred in its failure to
release Murdock; (3) allow the defense but find a "vaguely therapeutic purpose" for
hospitalizing him; or (4) confine him under a preventive detention rationale. Id. at 962-65
(Bazelon, J., dissenting).
142. No. 60898, 1992 WL 181709, at *1, *2 (Ohio App. 8 Dist. July 30, 1992),
constitutional appeal dismissed sua sponte, 604 N.E.2d 167 (1992). The dissent reveals that
the defendant's co-worker had called him "a nigger." Id at *7 (Harper, J., dissenting).
143. See id. at *6 (Harper, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at *1.
145. Id.
146. Id. at *3.
147. Id. at *6 (Harper, J., dissenting).
148. 698 P.2d 735, 736-37 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984).
149. Id. at 741-42.
150. Id. at 740.
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instruct on duress and mistake of fact. 51  The appellate court
affirmed the convictions, reasoning that there was no evidence of
duress, and that mistake of fact was embodied in the general
instruction on justification. 52
In the 1989 case of Lonnie Gilchrist, 53 a black stockbroker who
shot his white boss after being fired,"M black rage was used to
support an insanity defense.5  Defense counsel argued that
Gilchrist killed Cook "during a 'psychotic episode' that erupted from
years of paranoia nursed by a sense of racial grievance. '15 6
Gilchrist's attorneys presented the testimony of two psychiatrists and
151. Id. at 742.
152. Id. For a case raising a similar argument, see State v. Brown, 573 P.2d 675 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1977), cert. quashed, 573 P.2d 1204 (N.M. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 928 (1978),
remanded and appealed on different grounds, 599 P.2d 389 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979), cert.
quashed, 598 P.2d 215 (N.M. 1979). Brown assaulted a police officer; at trial the defense
presented the testimony of a social psychologist regarding the defendant's fear of the
police as the result of being a black male. Id. at 678. On appeal, the court held that the
exclusion of this testimony was erroneous: "[D]efendant's fear of the police was relevant
to whether defendant believed he was in immediate danger of bodily harm-an element
of self-defense." Id.
153. The case was heard in the Suffolk, Massachusets Superior Court. See Doris S.
Wong, Gilchrist Convicted of First-Degree Murder, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 18, 1989, at 1
[hereinafter Wong, Gilchrist Convicted]; Doris S. Wong, Doctor Says Gilchrist Knew
Actions Wrong, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 7, 1989, at 24 [hereinafter Wong, Doctor Says].
154. Gilchrist was fired for weak sales performance. Fired Stockbroker's Bail Reduced,
UPI, May 11, 1988, available in LEXIS, News Library, UPSTAT File. Before the killing,
Gilchrist had asked the local NAACP for help in suing his employer, Merrill Lynch, for
racial discrimination. Id. Merrill Lynch had settled a previous class action in which the
employees accused the firm of racial discrimination. Paul Langner, Gilchrist Called
'Psychotic' by Defense, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 31, 1989, at 17, 28. Gilchrist had made
repeated complaints about racism at the firm. Prosecution Rests Case in Gilchrist Trial,
UPI, Apr. 4, 1989, available in LEXIS, News Library, UPSTAT File. Gilchrist's firing was
not the first time that he had been upset about encountering racism; Gilchrist had
previously threatened a former employer and a car mechanic. Mike Barnicle, Making Use
of the System, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 5, 1989, at 19.
155. Goldberg, supra note 7, at 43.
156. Paul Langner, Co-worker Testifies of Threat by Gilchrist, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 1,
1989, at 25. Gilchrist believed that he had been continually discriminated against because
of his race. See, e.g., Barnicle, supra note 154, at 19 (Gilchrist believed world conspired
against him because he was black); Defense: Gilchrist Felt "Exploited", UPI, Apr. 5, 1989,
available in LEXIS, News Library, UPSTAT File (Gilchrist developed "militant view of
racism" and attributed personal setbacks to racial prejudice); Jury Selection to Start in
Stockbroker Shoot Case, UPI, Mar. 26, 1989, available in LEXIS, News Library, UPSTAT
File (Gilchrist "blamed racism for his professional shortcomings"); Opening Statements in
Trial of Former Stockbroker, UPI, Mar. 30, 1989, available in LEXIS, News Library,
UPSTAT File (Gilchrist felt he was the victim of racial bias); see also Michael A. Tesner,
Racial Paranoia as a Defense to Crimes of Violence: An Emerging Theory of Self-Defense
or Insanity?, 11 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.i. 307, 329-31 (1991) (discussing Gilchrist case as
one exemplifying racial paranoia-induced delusional disorders).
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one psychologist who opined that Gilchrist was temporarily insane at
the time of the killing. 7 The jury deliberated for five days, during
which time they twice asked the judge to repeat the legal definition
of insanity."5 8 After reporting that they were deadlocked and being
given an additional charge, the jury convicted Gilchrist of first-degree
murder and unlawfully carrying a firearm." 9 The judge sentenced
Gilchrist to a mandatory life term without parole for the murder;
160
the conviction was affirmed on appeal. 6'
D. Conclusion
The preceding overview of cases not only documents a growing
body of case law implicating defense theories based on the social
toxicity of the environment, but also demonstrates the diversity of
legal questions to which this information was addressed. The theories
of urban psychosis, television intoxication, and black rage served at
least four distinct functions within the doctrinal framework of the
criminal law: (1) to support an insanity defense; (2) to elucidate other
relevant mental states such as diminished capacity and provocation;
(3) to support a claim of self-defense; and (4) to play a mitigating role
in sentencing, especially with respect to the death penalty. Part III
explores these four doctrinal uses in greater detail.
157. Dr. Jeffrey L. Speller, a psychiatrist, testified that Gilchrist could not control his
actions. Wong, Doctor Says, supra note 152. Dr. Guy Seymour, a psychologist, testified
that Gilchrist was legally insane. Id. Dr. Seymour also testified that Gilchrist was
"overwhelmed by rage over what he believed was racial bias in his firing." Defense:
Gilchrist Felt "Exploited", supra note 156. Dr. Marc Whaley, a psychiatrist, stated that
Gilchrist's abilities to control his actions were "substantially impaired." Defense Rests Case
in Gilchrist Trial, UPI, Apr. 11, 1989, available in LEXIS, News Library, UPSTAT File.
The prosecution presented the testimony of Dr. Martin Kelly, a psychiatrist, who asserted
that Gilchrist was legally sane. Id. The testimony of these mental health experts took six
of the total of nine days of testimony. Doris S. Wong, No Verdict Yet in Trial of Gilchrist,
BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 16, 1989, at 37.
158. Dateline: Boston, UPI, Apr. 17, 1989, available in LEXIS, News Library,
UPSTAT File.
159. Wong, Gilchrist Convicted, supra note 153, at 1, 21; Doris S. Wong, Gilchrist
Lawyers ask Judge for New Trial in Murder Case, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 21, 1989, at 21.
160. Wong, Gilchrist Convicted, supra note 153, at 21.
161. Commonwealth v. Gilchrist, 597 N.E.2d 32,33-36 (Mass. 1992). According to one
news report, Gilchrist's attorneys intended to raise the question of diminished capacity on
appeal. Wong, Gilchrist Convicted, supra note 153, at 21.
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II. TiE SOCIAL SCIENCE: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECrS OF
REAL-LIFE VIOLENCE, TELEVISION VIOLENCE, AND RACISM
This Part surveys the social science research on the psychological
effects of real-life violence, television violence, and racism that
provides the scientific foundations for the defense theories of urban
psychosis, television intoxication, and black rage, respectively.
Because the relevant social science literature is diverse, complex, and
voluminous, the following presentation is necessarily limited in scope.
The goal of this section is threefold: (1) to provide an overview of
the types of information a defendant might present in any individual
case to substantiate one of the three defense theories; (2) to identify,
without an attempt to review exhaustively, major problem areas
associated with the three facets of the social science literature; and (3)
to explore preliminarily whether, as a threshold evidentiary matter,
the social science supporting these defenses is sufficiently developed
to merit consideration within the criminal law.
A. Urban Psychosis: The Effects of Real-Life Violence
For many adolescents coming of age in the 1990s, violence is
a daily reality. They experience it in their homes and
communities and witness the irresponsible portrayal of
violence on prime time television and in movies.162
The central social science premise underlying the urban-psychosis
cases, once one gets past the provocative nomenclature, is that the
defendant's mental state was significantly affected by his exposure to
real-life violence. Considerable social science exists regarding the
deleterious psychological consequences of experiencing and/or witnes-
sing violence firsthand. This research, in the form of clinical accounts
and empirical studies, covers a broad spectrum of contexts, including
studies on the effects of combat or war," battering or familial
162. Robert H. DuRant et al., Factors Associated with the Use of Violence Among
Urban Black Adolescents, 84 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 612, 617 (1994).
163. See, e.g., Salman Elbedour et al., Ecological Integrated Model of Children of War:
Individual and Social Psychology, 17 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECr 805 (1993); Javier I.
Escobar et al., Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder in Hispanic Vietnam Veterans: Clinical
Phenomenology and Sociocultural Characteristics, 171 J. NERvous & MENTAL DISEASE
585 (1983); Jane G. Schaller & Elena 0. Nightingale, Children and Childhoods: Hidden
Casualties of War and Civil Unrest, 268 JAMA 642 (1992).
758 [Vol. 74
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abuse,' 64 and criminal victimization, such as being raped. 65 The
consistent results of this broad-ranging research are that real-life
violence is traumatic to those exposed to it and can cause both full-
blown mental illness and psychological damage.
1. The Psychiatric Consequences of Violence: Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder
Firsthand exposure to violence may result in full-blown
psychiatric disorders. The most common psychiatric illness associated
with the trauma of experiencing real-life violence is Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder (PTSD). Notably, three of the urban-psychosis
defendants discussed above, Morgan, Taylor, and Osby, claimed that
they suffered from PTSD.1' While PTSD was originally recognized
as a compromise when veterans' groups attempted to lobby for the
inclusion of a category of psychiatric illness related to service in the
Vietnam war, 67 over time, PTSD has been expanded to include the
victims of battery and rape.'68
The basic diagnostic criteria of PTSD are:
The person has experienced an event that is outside the
range of usual human experience and that would be
markedly distressing to almost anyone, e.g., serious threat to
one's life or physical integrity; serious threat or harm to
one's children, spouse, or other close relatives and friends;
sudden destruction of one's home or community; or seeing
another person who has recently been, or is being seriously
164. See, eg., LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN (1979); LENORE E.
WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME (1984); LENORE WALKER, TERRIFYING
LovE: WHY BATTERED WOMEN KILL AND How SOCIETY RESPONDS (1989); Mary A.
Dutton & Lisa A. Goodman, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Among Battered Women:
Analysis of Legal Implications, 12 BEHAV. SC. & L. 215 (1994); Richard Famularo et al.,
Child Maltreatment and the Development of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, 147 AM. J.
DISEASES CHILDREN 755 (1993); Louise Kiernan, Complex Issues Trap Women in Abuse,
CHI. TRIB., Mar. 16, 1993, at 1.
165. See, e.g., Fran H. Norris et al., Use of Mental Health Services Among Victims of
Crime: Frequency, Correlates, and Subsequent Recovery, 58 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL
PSYCHOL. 538 (1990).
166. See supra notes 20-27 and accompanying text (discussing the Morgan case); notes
28-34 and accompanying text (discussing the Taylor case); notes 35-41 and accompanying
text (discussing the Osby case).
167. Dutton & Goodman, supra note 164, at 215; John E. Helzer et al., Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder in the General Population, NEW ENG. J. MED., Dec. 24, 1987, at 1630;
Thomas A. Moran, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, Broken Marriages, and the Appropriate
Grounds of Nullity, 54 JURIST 183, 186 (1994); SCRIGNAR, supra note 13, at 139.
168. Dutton & Goodman, supra note 164, at 215.
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injured or killed as the result of an accident or physical
violence. 69
The individual must also satisfy four additional requirements: (1) one
of four possible intrusive symptoms, (2) three of seven possible
avoidance symptoms, (3) two of six possible arousal symptoms, and
(4) the disturbance must continue for at least one month.17 In the
latest version of the American Psychiatric Association's diagnostic
manual, DSM-IV, a few of the diagnostic criteria of PTSD have been
169. Idt
170. The American Psychiatric Association lists the requirements as follows:
B. The traumatic event is persistently reexperienced in at least one of the
following ways:
(1) recurrent and intrusive distressing recollections of the event (in young
children, repetitive play in which themes or aspects of the trauma are
expressed)
(2) recurrent distressing dreams of the event
(3) sudden acting or feelings as if the traumatic event were recurring
(includes a sense of reliving the experience, illusions, hallucinations, and
dissociative [flashback] episodes, even those that occur upon awakening
or vhen intoxicated)
(4) intense psychological distress at exposure to events that symbolize or
resemble an aspect of the traumatic event, including anniversaries of the
trauma [and]
C. Persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma or numbing of
general responsiveness (not present before trauma), as indicated by at least
three of the following:
(1) efforts to avoid thoughts or feelings associated with the trauma
(2) efforts to avoid activities or situations that arouse recollections of the
trauma
(3) inability to recall an important aspect of the trauma (psychogenic
amnesia)
(4) markedly diminished interest in significant activities (in young children,
loss of recently acquired developmental skills such as toilet training or
language skills)
(5) feeling of detachment or estrangement from others
(6) restricted range of affect, e.g., unable to have loving feelings
(7) sense of foreshortened future, e.g., does not expect to have a career,
marriage, or children, or a long life [and]
D. Persistent symptoms of increased arousal (not present before the trauma),
as indicated by at least two of the following:
(1) difficulty falling or staying asleep
(2) irritability or outbursts of anger
(3) difficulty concentrating
(4) hypervigilance
(5) exaggerated startle response
(6) physiologic reactivity upon exposure to events that symbolize or
resemble an aspect of the traumatic event ... [and]
E. Duration of the disturbance (symptoms in B, C, and D) of at least one
month.
DSM-III, supra note 13, at 250-51.
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modified.' Also, the mental health community has discussed the
possibility of recognizing a more chronic form of the disorder as well
as a separate category related to depression.'
Although PTSD may be the most common response to the
experience of violence, a number of other psychiatric disorders
may also result.74 Research has also indicated that often PTSD is
accompanied by other forms of mental illness-comorbidity, as it is
sometimes called. 75
Exposure to trauma or violence is a necessary, but not sufficient,
condition for the development of PTSD, such that not all individuals
who are exposed to violence develop PTSD. For example, not all
Vietnam veterans, battered women, and rape victims have PTSD'76
Considerable dispute exists regarding the role of personality or
vulnerability factors in the development of PTSD.'77 One such
factor may be ethnicity or race. 78 Also, some researchers have
suggested that characteristics of the trauma itself may incline a person
to develop PTSD 79  Finally, violence or aggressive behavior,
171. On these new criteria, Dutton and Goodman comment:
The DSM-IV draft criteria eliminate the requirement that the event be outside
the range of usual human experience and instead characterize a traumatic event
as one in which "the person has experienced, witnessed, or been confronted with
an event or events that involve actual or threatened death or serious injury, or
a threat to the physical integrity of oneself or others" and where the person's
response has been "intense fear, helplessness, or horror."
Dutton & Goodman, supra note 164, at 216 (citations omitted).
172. 1& at 217; Judith L. Herman, Sequelae of Prolonged and Repeated Trauma:
Evidence for a Complex Positraumatic Syndrome (DESNOS), in POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS
DISORDER: DSM-IV AND BEYOND 213, 213 (Jonathan R. T. Davidson & Edna B. Foa
eds., 1993) [hereinafter DSM-IV AND BEYOND].
173. Jonathan R. T. Davidson & John A. Fairbank, The Epidemiology of Posttraumatic
Stress Disorder, in DSM-IV AND BEYOND, supra note 172, at 147, 166.
174. Dutton & Goodman, supra note 164, at 217; Escobar et al., supra note 163, at 594.
175. Davidson & Fairbank, supra note 173, at 155-58; Dutton & Goodman, supra note
164, at 217; Helzer et al., supra note 167, at 1633; Frederick S. Sierles et al., Posttraumatic
Stress Disorder and Concurrent Psychiatric Illness: A Preliminary Report, 140 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1177, 1178 (1983).
176. Dutton & Goodman, supra note 164, at 218.
177. Davidson & Fairbank, supra note 173, at 158-59; Dutton & Goodman, supra note
164, at 218; Escobar et al., supra note 163, at 588; Helzer et al., supra note 167, at 1633;
Walter E. Penk et al., Ethnicity: Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) Differences
Among Black, White, and Hispanic Veterans Who Differ in Degrees of Exposure to Combat
in Vietnam, 45 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 729, 735 (1989); Heidi S. Resnick et al., Vul-
nerability-Stress Factors in Development of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, 180 J. NERVOUS
& MENTAL DISEASE 424, 424 (1992).
178. Escobar et al., supra note 163, at 588; Penk et al., supra note 177, at 729.
179. Resnick et al., supra note 177, at 424.
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including violence directed towards others and oneself, such as
suicide, is only one possible outcome of PTSD"
Future research in the area is likely to examine the long-term or
chronic consequences of PTSD.' Furthermore, some research
exists on the fabrication of PTSD symptoms and the use of objective
criteria in making the diagnoses without relying exclusively on clinical
evaluations.ln
2. The Psychological Consequences of Violence
In addition to causing psychiatric disorders, exposure to real-life
violence can lead to a wide variety of psychological and physical
consequences: emotional problems such as depression and
anxiety;" cognitive and developmental impairment resulting in poor
school performance and academic achievement;"s physiological
reactions such as cardiovascular disease and neurological
maladies;s and behavioral outcomes including suicide and violence
directed toward others. 8 6
Four aspects of the research regarding the effects of violence are
particularly noteworthy within this context. First, the effects of
violence on children may be especially deleterious. Garbarino, one
of the experts in the Morgan case,'17 and others have pointed out
180. Escobar et al., supra note 163, at 589 (violence or suicide are possible outcomes
of PTSD); Herman, supra note 172, at 223 (sufferers of PTSD often engage in harm-
seeking behavior); Moran, supra note 167, at 198 (outbursts of rage and violence are
possible sequelae).
181. Herman, supra note 172, at 224.
182. E.g., John A. Fairbank et al., Psychometric Detection of Fabricated Symptoms of
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, 142 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 501 (1985).
183. Cathy Spatz Widom, Does Violence Beget Violence?: A Critical Examination of
the Literature, 106 PSYCHOL. BULL. 3, 24 (1989).
184. James Garbarino, Children's Response to Community Violence: What Do We
Know?, 14 INFANT MENTAL HEALTH J. 103, 107 (1993); James Garbarino et al., What
Children Can Tell Us About Living in Danger, 46 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 376,378 (1991); see
also Dutton & Goodman, supra note 164, at 222 (discussing cognitive changes resulting
from batterings); Moran, supra note 167, at 203-04 (discussing impairment of developmen-
tal process in forming an adult identity).
185. Jack Gladstein & Elisa J. Slater, Inner City Teenagers' Exposure to Violence: A
Prevalence Study, 37 MD. MED. J. 951, 951 (1988); Jean Latz Griffin, Pain, Trauma Linger
for Kids in Urban War, CHI. TRIB., July 23, 1993, at IN; Martha Shirk, 'They Live in a
World of Chronic Danger'; Children of Today May Be Most Fearful, Experts Say, ST.
Louis POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 26, 1993, at IA.
186. Garbarino et al., supra note 184, at 382; Gladstein & Slater, supra note 185, at 951;
Bambade H. Shakoor & Deborah Chalmers, Co-Victimization of African-American
Children Who Witness Violence:. Effects on Cognitive, Emotional, and Behavioral
Development, 83 J. NAT'L MED. ASS'N 233, 236-37 (1991).
187. See supra notes 20-27 and accompanying text.
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that children are more vulnerable than their adult counterparts to the
experience of violence.8 ' For children, the trauma associated with
experiencing violence may arrest or impair developmental processes
with long-term consequences. Minority youth may be particularly
affected by the experience of violence because of their social
environment.'89
Second, the phenomenon of chronic violence may be more
psychologically devastating than discrete episodes of acute danger or
trauma.Y While an episode of acute danger may only necessitate
situational adjustment,'9'
Chronic danger imposes a requirement for developmen-
tal adjustment-accommodations that are likely to include
persistent PTSD, alterations of personality, and major
changes in patterns of behavior or articulations of ideological
interpretations of the world that provide a framework for
making sense of ongoing danger, particularly when that
danger comes from the violent overthrow of day-to-day
social reality, as is the case in war, communal violence, or
chronic violent crime.192
Thus, children who are forced to cope with chronic danger may adapt
in dysfunctional ways. 93
Third, researchers have noted that one possible sequela of
violence is violence itself-the so-called cycle-of-violence
hypothesis 4  One social scientist surveyed the extant literature
regarding this hypothesis and concluded:
How do we interpret existing research findings? Being
abused as a child may increase one's risk for becoming an
188. Garbarino comments:
The concept of a "socially toxic" environment is particularly relevant to
vulnerable children. This is easily understood if we first think about who is most
vulnerable to a physical toxicity in the environment. When airborne pollution
gets really bad who suffers first and most? It is the most vulnerable, the kids
(and the elders) with asthma and other respiratory conditions who show the
effects soonest and with greatest intensity.
Garbarino, Growing Up, supra note 10, at 7.
189. DuRant et al., supra note 162, at 612.
190. Norris et al., supra note 165, at 544 ("The need for assistance was most
pronounced when the recent incident followed other victimization experiences.... More
generally, this finding suggests that persons whose lives are chronically prone to violence
(e.g., victims of spouse abuse) may be an important population for mental health
services.").
191. Garbarino et al., supra note 184, at 377.
192. Id
193. Id. at 378.
194. E.g., Widom,supra note 183 (examining critically the cycle-of-violence hypothesis).
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abusive parent, a delinquent, or an adult violent criminal.
However, on the basis of the findings from the existing
literature, it cannot be said that the pathway is straight or
certain.19
One possible causal explanation for violent behavior on the part
of those exposed to violence is social learning theory, which suggests
that children learn or model the behavior that they observe." 6 A
second explanation is a variant of the frustration-aggression
hypothesis. 7  Frustration when combined with highly salient
aggression cues may result in violence. "Frustration, television
violence, interpersonal violence in the home, or community violence
provide the arousal and stimulation."'98
Fourth, while most of the research on the effects of violence has
focused on situation-specific examples such as combat, battering, or
rape, some research exists on the effects of living in modern urban
environments. "Several studies have focused on children who witness
family violence, but very few studies have addressed the more
encompassing problem of children who witness community violence
in the inner city."' 99 Several authors have commented that many
modern cities resemble war zones;2' violence is a daily occurrence
195. Id. at 24.
196. Robert DuRant comments that:
Within this social environment, cultural transmission theory proposes that crimes
and delinquency are learned in interaction with other people, largely within
intimate primary groups such as families, peer groups, or gangs. There is
extensive evidence that many children and adolescents are continuously exposed
to high levels of violence throughout their lives and that this socialization may
have a significant effect on the increase in violent behavior observed over the last
40 years. This includes witnessing violence on television and in movies, in the
community, and in the home; the proliferation of gun ownership by adolescents;
and being a victim of violence, severe corporal punishment, and early physical
abuse.
DuRant et al., supra note 162, at 612. See also Richard Dembo et al., Psychosocial,
Alcohol/Other Drug Use, and Delinquency Differences Between Urban Black and White
Male High Risk Youth, 29 INT'L J. ADDICrIONS 461, 465-66 (1994) (comparing the
sociocultural view of delinquency among black youths to the disturbed personality
explanation for white youths).
197. See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 5 (discussing generally the need for open-minded
consideration of a "rotten social background" defense in criminal law).
198. Shakoor & Chalmers, supra note 186, at 237; see also Widom, supra note 183, at
24 (discussing triggering mechanisms).
199. Shakoor & Chalmers, supra note 186, at 234.
200. Garbarino et al., supra note 184, at 382 (comparing high-crime neighborhoods of
Chicago with Nicaragua, Mozambique, Cambodia, and Israel/Palestine); Shakoor &
Chalmers, supra note 186, at 234 ("Recent media reports have been comparing the
experiences of inner city children to those of children from war zones such as Belfast,
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for many individuals, particularly children, in these milieux.2"' The
experience of violence in the community is as psychologically
devastating as in any other context.2°
3. Discussion
The major criticism of the social science research on the effects
of real-life violence is that only a few studies are specifically geared
toward assessing the impact of living in a violent, urban environment;
the greater portion of this research concerns the effects of other forms
of violence, such as familial abuse, crime victimization, and combat.
While additional research on the specific effects of urban living would
be beneficial, it is critical to understand that these other forms of
violence may be the constituent elements of urban dwelling.
Individuals residing in modern, urban environments may experience
discrete acts of violence within their homes, e.g., battering; within
their neighborhoods, e.g., rape or crime victimization; or in their
communities, e.g., dodging bullets like soldiers in war. Furthermore,
the particular source of violence is largely irrelevant in terms of its
psychological sequelae; for example, PTSD may result from any of
these types of violence. Thus, because individuals exposed to various
forms of violence associated with urban dwelling may be
phenomenologically indistinguishable from battered women, rape
victims, and Vietnam veterans, they should be treated similarly within
the context of the criminal law. Alan Dershowitz, one of the major
critics of the abuse excuse, carries this argument one step further,
asserting that those who experience violence as part of their overall
Ireland, or Israel."); Aileen M. Bigelow, Note, In the Ghetto: The State's Duty to Protect
Inner-City Children from Violence, 7 NoTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 533, 567
(1993) ("Children in our inner-city housing projects are growing-up in a war zone."); Delia
O'Hara, Violence Threatens to Turn Innocent Kids Into Killers, CHI. SUN-TIMES, June 11,
1989, at 43 ("The fact is that the children of Chicago's high-rise slums live in an
environment as dangerous as any of the world's war zones."); Shirk, supra note 185, at 1A
("Children in cities now have much in common with kids in war zones, Garbarino says.");
20/20, supra note 18 ("[T]here's mounting evidence that chronic violence does have
disturbing effects on children. [Garbarino] has been studying the impact of trauma on
youth in war zones around the world, including the public housing project visible from his
Chicago office.").
201. DuRant et al., supra note 162, at 617; Bigelow, supra note 200, at 538-39; James
M. Lukas, Urban Psychosis: License to Kill?, (July 8, 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author); see also Naomi Breslau et al., Traumatic Events and Posttraumatic Stress
Disorder in an Urban Population of Young Adults, 48 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 216, 221
(1991) (finding rates of exposure to PTSD events vary across populations).
202. See Bigelow, supra note 200, at 567 (equating the psychological devastation to the
post-traumatic stress disorder suffered by war veterans).
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environment may be more sympathetic than battered women, for
instance, because they have no choice regarding their exposureyn3
B. Television Intoxication: The Effects of Television Violence 4
An important feature of the socially toxic environment is the
culture communicated through television and the movies.2 5
In its simplest form, the defense theory of television intoxication
rests on two corollary propositions. First, that a defendant's viewing
of television violence materially contributed to her subsequent
criminal behavior. Second, that although television viewing is usually
considered a voluntary activity, it may become addictive and thus
qualify as an involuntary form of behavior.
1. The Positive Correlation Between Television Violence and
Aggressive Behavior
A considerable body of empirical research exists on the relation-
ship between television violence and subsequent aggressive behavior.
This research is noteworthy in three respects. First, the research
spans more than forty years; the earliest research on television
violence was conducted in the 1950s.2 6  Second, the research on
television violence is extensive and broad-ranging; some estimates
place the number of studies conducted at between 2,000 and
203. Milloy, supra note 36, at D1, D6, comments:
Harvard law professor Alan Dershowitz said the claim of urban survival
syndrome in the Osby case was actually more plausible than the post-traumatic
stress disorder defense that was used successfully in the case of accused parent
killers Eric and Lyle Menendez and in the case of Lorena Bobbitt....
"Those defendants had options," Dershowitz said. "They were middle class.
They could leave."
IdL
204. This discussion focuses on the research with respect to television because it is the
most well-developed. For research on the effects of pornography and music lyrics, see
supra notes 78-91 and accompanying text.
205. Garbarino, Growing Up, supra note 10, at 8.
206. Candy J. Cooper, Watching for Trouble/Violence on TV Increases Aggression,
Researcher Finds After Decades of Study, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Oct. 23,1993, at 1A, 4A.
But cf. Prettyman & Hook, supra note 66, at 320-22 (suggesting research on television
violence is the latest in a long line of research on media-related violence that began with
studies on the effects of violent movies and comic books).
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3,000.07 Third, legislative and-executive governmental entities have
actively participated in this research." 8
The primary, and almost unanimous, finding common to this
extensive body of research is that a positive correlation exists between
viewing violent television programs and subsequent aggressive
behavior. For example, in 1972, the Surgeon General's Committee
concluded:
Thus, there is a convergence of the fairly substantial
experimental evidence for short-run causation of aggression
among some children by viewing violence on the screen and
the much less certain evidence from field studies that
extensive violence viewing precedes long-run manifestations
of aggressive behavior. This convergence of the two types
of evidence constitutes some preliminary indication of a
causal relationship, but a good deal of research remains to
be done before one can have confidence in these
conclusions.0 9
In 1982, the National Institute of Mental Health updated the
Surgeon General's report and concluded:
Most of the researchers look at the totality of the evidence
and conclude, as did the Surgeon General's Advisory
Committee, that the convergence of findings supports the
conclusion of a causal relationship between televised
violence and later aggressive behavior. The evidence now is
drawn from a large body of literature. Adherents to this
convergence approach agree that the conclusions reached in
the Surgeon General's program have been significantly
strengthened by more recent research.
210
More recently, the American Psychological Association's
Commission on Violence and Youth reported: "There is absolutely
no doubt that higher levels of viewing violence on television are
correlated with increased acceptance of aggressive attitudes and
207. See, e.g., Prettyman & Hook, supra note 66, at 326. But see Campbell, supra note
66, at 422 ("Studies on television violence realistically number no more than 200."). In the
following section, I rely primarily on summaries or compilations of the voluminous
research in this area rather than the primary studies themselves.
208. See infra notes 209-10.
209. SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY COMMITrEE ON TELEVISION AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR,
TELEVISION AND GROWING UP: THE IMPACT OF TELEVISED VIOLENCE (1972).
210. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, TELEVISION AND BEHAVIOR: TEN
YEARS OF SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EIGHTIES 37 (1982).
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increased aggressive behavior." '' Even critics acknowledge the
near unanimity of this finding within the social science com-
munity. 2
2. Causal Theories of Aggression
While a considerable consensus exists among social scientists that
there is a positive correlation between viewing violent television
programs and subsequent aggressive behavior, there is far less
unanimity about the meaning of that correlation. Although problems
inhere in the inference of a causal relationship based upon a
correlation, scientists sometimes feel justified in making such an
inference.1 4 This has been the case with regard to research on
211. 1 COMMISSION ON VIOLENCE & YOUTH, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS'N, VIOLENCE &
YOUTH: PSYCHOLOGY'S RESPONSE 33 (1993).
212. Campbell, supra note 66, at 421, and sources collected therein.
213. As a threshold matter, the old scientific aphorism that correlation does not imply
causation must be considered. Two basic problems exist with inferring a causal
relationship from a correlation. The first problem concerns directionality: which variable
causes the other? In context, the issue is whether viewing television violence causes
aggressive behavior or, alternatively, whether aggressive individuals tend to watch violent
television. The second problem is the possible existence of a third variable that may be
responsible for causing both events. Thus, the issue is whether "both viewing violent
programs and aggression are products of a third condition or set of conditions. Other
variables, such as socioeconomic status, age, and sex, have been found to interact with
aggressive behavior. Other variables, such as pre-existing levels of aggression and
personality factors, may be influential." Campbell, supra note 66, at 434-35 (footnotes
omitted).
214. An excellent example of this phenomenon concerns the research on cigarette
smoking and lung cancer. Although the precise mechanism through which smoking causes
lung cancer is not well-understood, the consensus is that such a causal connection does
exist. The Surgeon General's Report on smoking and health concluded as follows:
The causal significance of an association is a matter of judgment which goes
beyond any statement of statistical probability. To judge or evaluate the causal
significance of the association between [cigarette smoking and lung cancer] ...
a number of criteria must be utilized, no one of which, [by itself], is pathog-
nomonic or a sine qua non for judgment. These criteria include:
(a) the consistency of the association
(b) the strength of the association
(c) the specificity of the association
(d) the temporal relationship of the association
(e) the coherence of the association.
SURGEON GENERAL'S ADVISORY COMMrITEE ON SMOKING AND HEALTH, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH EDUCATION AND WELFARE, SMOKING AND HEALTH 20
(1964).
Garbarino, the expert in Morgan, has analogized the research on television violence
to that on cigarette smoking:
Understanding the consequences of television for childhood and youth is a bit
like understanding the effects of smoking on health. It is difficult to see a simple
[Vol. 74
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television violence. In this connection, social scientists have advanced
at least four possible theories of causation: (1) social learning, (2)
desensitization, (3) the "mean world" hypothesis, and (4) instigation.
According to the social learning theory, perhaps the most popular
theory of causation, television violence causes real-life violence
because children and adults learn violence by watching television.215
The learning can be immediate, as shown in cases in which the viewer
specifically imitates the actions of a television character.216
However, the theory is better understood in more longitudinal terms.
Television, like other sources of information about the world, allows
children to learn or model behavior that they see, just as they might
model the behavior of adults, peers, or teachers. " 'Because children
learn from what they see, it should surprise no one that violence on
television clearly provokes violent or aggressive behavior in children
, 5)217
The second causal theory is that the exposure to violence in the
media desensitizes the viewer to it and therefore makes it more likely
and direct link between smoking and health.... And yet, the scientific proof
that smoking-even being in the presence of smoking-is bad for your health is
clear.... It's taken a generation of research and advocacy, but the message is
now well established and has sunk in.
Garbarino, Growing Up, supra note 10, at 9.
Similarly, the movement toward treating violence as a public health problem
resembles the approach taken with respect to cigarette smoking.'
In one of today's JAMA articles, Washington state physician Brandon Centerwall
cited studies suggesting that one major source of violence in society was violence
in television. "Children's exposure to television and television violence should
become part of the public health agenda, along with safety belts, bicycle helmets,
immunizations and good nutrition," he said.
Jim Detjen & Susan Fitzgerald, Experts See Epidemic of Violence Murders Reached an All-
Time High Last Year. A Former Surgeon General Urged that a Public Health Campaign
be Waged to Stem Gun-Related Deaths., PHILA. INQUIRER, June 10, 1992, at A02.
215. See Campbell, supra note 66, at 424-25, 430-31 (describing research on children's
imitation); see also Prettyman & Hook, supra note 66, at 327-28 (discussing the modeling
or instructional hypothesis).
216. Some convicted felons have also claimed that they learned new forms of
committing crimes by watching television. Schlegel, supra note 66, at 199. A recent
example of possible imitative violence was the firebombing of a New York subway token
booth which closely resembled a scene from the movie "Money Train." Harold Schecter,
A Movie Made Me Do It, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1995, at 15.
217. Elizabeth Kolbert, Television Gets Closer Look As a Factor in Real Violence, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 14, 1994, at D20 (quoting Dr. William Dietz, a pediatrician and an expert on
children and violence); see also Brandon S. Centerwall, Television Violence: The Scale of
the Problem and Where to Go From Here, 267 JAMA 3059, 3059-60 (1992) (discussing
television in relation to child development).
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that she will engage in that conduct at a later date. Dr. Benjamin
Spock provides a good explanation of this causal theory:
Recent psychological experiments have proved that
watching violence has a desensitizing and brutalizing effect
on people-children and adults alike. By 'desensitizing,' I
mean that individuals brought up by kindly parents will at
first be shocked and horrified when they see one person
committing an act of violence against another. But if they
continue to see violence regularly, they will gradually take
it for granted as standard human behavior."8
Thus, under the desensitization theory, violence becomes more
socially acceptable because of repeated exposure in the media. The
glamorization of violence on television may make this effect even
more pronounced 19
A third causal explanation, Gerbner's "mean world"
hypothesis,' holds that watching television causes viewers to
become more cynical about the world. "[T]elevision distorts viewers'
perceptions of violence when it portrays disproportionate levels of
violence and aggression compared to that in the real world. Violent
programming cultivates fear and anxiety in its audience.
''21
Finally, some have suggested that viewing violence instigates
subsequent violent behavior.' In other words, media violence is
a catalyst for subsequent real-life violence. This theory, however,
appears to be little more than a tautological explanation.
In addition to these causal theories of aggression, Garbarino has
noted that "[a] second, much less well documented effect of television
is in suppressing social interaction in the family and the community,
while paradoxically increasing awareness of economic inequal-
ities."'  He adds: "It seems reasonable to expect that, as time
with adults declines the impact of what children see and hear from
218. Benjamin Spock, How On-Screen Violence Hurls Your Kids, REDBOOK, Nov.1987,
at 26. Other authors have noted this causal theory. See, e.g., COMMISSION ON VIOLENCE
AND YOUTH, supra note 211, at 33; Prettyman & Hook, supra note 66, at 328-29; Schlegel,
supra note 66, at 202; Kim, supra note 66, at 1391; Kolbert, supra note 217, at A13.
219. See, e.g., Centerwall, supra note 217, at 3059 (stating that children view television
as factual information-viewing television desensitizes children to violence).
220. See Schlegel, supra note 66, at 201-02 (discussing Gerbner's theory); Kolbert, supra
note 217, at D20 (same); see also Kim, supra note 66, at 1390-91 (discussing television's
effect on the cultivation of American society).
221. Kim, supra note 66, at 1391.
222. See Prettyman & Hook, supra note 66, at 329-330 (discussing arousal or incitement
hypothesis); Campbell, supra note 66, at 423-24,428-430 (discussing television's instigation
of violence).
223. Garbarino, Growing Up, supra note 10, at 11.
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television increases. ... These two features of social toxicity-violent
messages and decreased adult influence-work in conspiratorial
fashion. And today we reap the bitter fruits of that develop-
ment." 4
3. The Voluntariness of Television Viewing
Another problem associated with the television-intoxication cases
concerns the voluntary nature of television viewing-a condition that
distinguishes this defense from urban psychosis and black rage.
Unfortunately, the available social science does not address the issue
of voluntariness to any considerable degree. However, two possible
avenues exist to address this issue. The first is to consider television
as an addictive substance. Rubin characterized Zamora as a "true
television addict""z and Howard's defense attorney called him a
"rap addict."6 Moreover, some research suggests that television
does have addicting qualities.' Thus, the voluntariness of the
activity might be dispelled by considering that the defendant's ability
to choose has been heavily circumscribed along the way.
The second possible avenue for evaluating the voluntariness of
television viewing is to consider the defendant's lack of knowledge
about its toxic effects, i.e., psychological damage. Involuntary
intoxication cases include instances in which the defendant voluntarily
consumed a substance without knowledge of its intoxicating
qualities.' 8 Thus, if a defendant viewed television -violence and was
unaware that it might cause psychological damage, the voluntary
nature of the viewing might be disputed. These two lines of thought
fit together nicely in that the consumption of an addictive substance
without awareness of its intoxicating and addictive qualities provides
the quintessential example of involuntary intoxication.
224. I. at 12-13.
225. RUBIN & MATERA, supra note 46, at 32.
226. Munn, supra note 86, at 477.
227. See, e.g., Frontline, supra note 49 (describing addictive qualities of television
viewing).
228. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScoTr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 394 (2d ed. 1986)
("One such case is when the intoxication has resulted from an innocent mistake by the
defendant as to the character of the substance taken, as when another person has tricked
him into the liquor or drugs."); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(5)(b) (1962) (" 'Self-
induced intoxication' means intoxication caused by substances which the actor knowingly
introduces into his body, the tendency of which to cause intoxication he knows or ought
to know, unless he introduces them pursuant to medical advice or under such circumstan-
ces as would afford a defense to a charge of crime.").
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4. Discussion
The social science literature on the effects of television violence
is arguably the most controversial of the three areas of research." 9
While strong empirical support exists for the proposition that violent
television programming is correlated with subsequent aggressive
behavior, the meaning of this association is not entirely clear.
Researchers have suggested that television violence may be only one
variable within a web of causative factors resulting in aggression and,
furthermore, that it is difficult to isolate the effects of television
violence from a host of other influences. Notably, this claim
corresponds to that made by two defendants, Long and Howard, who
asserted only that media violence was one of several factors leading
to their criminal behavior." °  In contrast, a third defendant,
Zamora, argued that television was the predominant socializing
influence in his life."' The empirical issue of what effect media
violence has on a particular defendant might be solved by requiring
that the defendant demonstrate the inordinate and idiosyncratic
influence that television violence played in his life.
A second possible criticism of the social science literature on the
effects of television violence is that, unlike the research on either real-
life violence or racism, little evidence exists to demonstrate that
television violence causes recognized categories of psychiatric illness,
although one author reported that two children developed PTSD as
229. The television-intoxication theory of defense is also controversial because of the
First Amendment issues it engenders; these issues are beyond the scope of the present
analysis. For treatment of the First Amendment issues associated with all forms of media
violence see supra notes 46-91 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text (discussing the Long case); notes 86-
91 and accompanying text (discussing the Howard case).
231. RUBIN & MATERA, supra note 46, at 51-60. Zamora's mother placed him before
a television set at a very early age because she could not afford a baby-sitter:
Her solution to the child-care dilemma was to purchase a television set, sit young
Ronny down in front of it, and pray that it captured his attention enough to keep
him safe while she was working and attending school. It did. The neighbors who
looked in on him reported that Ronny was mesmerized by the images on the
screen. Later, when the Zamoras were able to afford a baby-sitter, the woman
they hired noted Ronny's fascination and continued to allow him to sit glued in
front of the set eight hours a day, even feeding him while he watched ....
Mrs. Zamora described how her son would pretend to go to sleep each night
at 9:00 p.m., then sneak out of his room and turn the television back on. He
would watch until the small hours of the morning, frequently falling asleep on the
couch or on the rug in front of the set.
It at 31-32, 36-37.
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the result of watching a television ghost story.32 On one hand, the
research on television violence is more powerful because it supports
a closer connection between the social toxin of media violence and
aggression, the resulting behavior of interest to the criminal justice
system, without the mediating construct of a mental illness. On the
other hand, the absence of an identifiable mental illness in television-
intoxication cases may require resort to other doctrinal categories,
such as intoxication, which explicate the loss of voluntary control in
a more straightforward manner.
C. Black Rage: The Effects of Racism
It is the transformation of this quantum of grief into aggres-
sion of which we now speak. As a sapling bent low stores
energy for a violent backswing, blacks bent double by
oppression have stored energy which will be released in the
form of rage-black rage, apocalyptic and final. 3
The underlying empirical assumption in the black-rage cases is
that the environmental or cultural phenomenon of racism affects the
mental functioning of individuals. In the following review of the
social science research relevant to this defense, two facts should
become apparent. First, a broad and diverse range of research exists
on the question of racism's effect on mental and physical health.
Information may be found in the psychiatric, psychological,
sociological, and medical literatures as well as in popular non-fiction
works. The second characteristic of the relevant research is its
embryonic nature. Almost all writing in this area stresses the need
for more specific and systematic empirical research on the effects of
racism. For this reason, the following information must be viewed
with some caution. Further, racism in the selection and funding of
232. Chris Mihill, TV Ghost Story Left 2 Boys with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, THE
GUARDIAN, Feb. 4, 1994, at 3.
233. GRIER & COBBS, supra note 92, at 210. For another analogy to trees, see Wong,
Doctor Says, supra note 153, at 24, reporting on the Gilchrist case:
The mental disorder, Speller testified, is not easily detected and could allow him
to continue with everyday habits. Speller likened Gilchrist to a tree with a fungal
disease. "The tree is still standing, has leaves and blooms every spring, but it's
diseased inside. A hurricane comes along and it breaks, it snaps. A tree without
disease inside would bend," Speller said.
See also JOE R. FEAGIN & MELVIN P. SIKES, LIVING WITH RACISM: THE BLACK
MIDDLE-CLASS EXPERIENCE vii (1994) (" 'What is it like to be a black person in white
America today? One step from suicide! ... [I]t's really a mental health problem. It's a
wonder we haven't all gone out and killed somebody or killed ourselves.' ").
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research may play a role in its unavailability, a problem treated
separately at the end of this section.
1. The Psychiatric, Psychological, and Medical Consequences
Consensus exists among social scientists that racism has a
negative effect on the mental and physical health of black individuals.
As one author noted, "[t]he major and overriding psychiatric problem
of the black minority is the withering effect of racism."" Cash
provides a good summary of the multidimensional effects of racism:
Those Black Americans who have chosen to play the game
of "follow the leader" could experience psychotic and
neurotic depression, hostility, anger, and states of violence
coupled with lowered self-esteem and ego destruction.
Additionally, they may suffer physical symptoms of stressful
living such as hypertension, obesity, and the many other
serious physical problems that can result from these two,
such as heart disease, diabetes, and arterial sclerosis."
The multifaceted nature of psychological dysfunction engendered by
racism, only one aspect of which is rage, is one reason that the
sobriquet of "black rage" is not only unduly provocative, but also
inaccurate. A better term might be the one suggested by Aggrey
Burke-"racism-related disorders. ' '23 6
234. Chester M. Pierce, Psychiatric Problems of the Black Minority, in AMERICAN
HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 512, 512 (Gerald Caplan ed., 2d ed. 1974); see also James H.
Carter, Racism's Impact on Mental Health, 86 J. NAT'L MED. ASS'N 543, 546 (1994)
("Racism affects mental health in a most pernicious manner. This fact has been well
documented and chronicled by historians, medical anthropologists, sociologists, and mental
health professionals.... Epidemiological studies of mental illness invariably identify racism
as a major contributor to psychopathology."); Harold W. Neighbors, Clinical Care Update:
Minorities/The Prevention of Psychopathology in African Americans: An Epidemiologic
Perspective, 26 COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH J.167, 167 (1990) ("Many have argued that
stressful social conditions are the major cause of mental disorder in blacks and thus
psychopathology can be prevented by eliminating racism, oppression and poor economic
conditions."); Ronnie Priest, Racism and Prejudice as Negative Impacts on African
American Clients in Therapy, 70 J. COUNSELING & DEV. 213, 213 (1991) ("The existing
literature also suggests that racism has negative impacts on African Americans in ways that
may necessitate their seeking counseling.") (citations omitted).
235. Eugene Cash, Jr., Extra-Dimensional Systemic Frustrations that Endanger the
Mental Health of Black People, in KEY MENTAL HEALTH ISSUES IN THE BLACK
COMMUNrrY 2 (Eugene Cash, Jr. et al. eds., 1976); see also Harold Rosen & Jerome D.
Frank, Negroes in Psychotherapy, 119 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 456, 458 (1962) ("Racial
discrimination may contribute to the psychopathology of the individual Negro patient in
a variety of ways.").
236. Aggrey W. Burke, Is Racism a Causatory Factor in Mental Illness?, 30 INT'L J.
SOC. PSYCHIATRY 1, 1 (1984); see also Joe Ravetz, Ethnicity, Race and Mental Health, 8
SOC. WORK EDUC. 37, 38 (1989) (discussing Burke's views).
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From the psychiatric and social psychiatric?"7 literature, clinical
accounts abound of individuals whose psychopathology was directly
connected to the effects of racism." Anecdotal accounts of the
effects of racism on individuals are also detailed in two recent books:
The Rage of a Privileged Class' 9 and Living with Racism.40
In terms of psychiatric problems, research suggests that black
individuals may suffer from serious psychiatric problems as the result
of racism. One common symptom is paranoia; black individuals who
suffer from mental illness are more commonly diagnosed with
schizophrenia, rather than affective disorders.24 Further, PTSD
may result from specific acts of racial discrimination or
237. Social psychiatry is "concerned with the effect of the sociocultural environment on
the underlying conflict, the clinical syndromes, the distribution, frequency, treatment and
management of psychiatric disorders among different populations and sub-groups within
populations." Ari Kiev, Psychiatric Disorders in Minority Groups, in PSYCHOLOGY AND
RACE 416, 416 (Peter Watson ed., 1973); see also Robert L. Bragg, Discussion: Cultural
Aspects of Mental Health Care for Black Americans, in CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHIATRY
179, 180 (Albert Gaw ed., 1982) ("These clinics emphasize a social psychiatry that focuses
on external stressors on adaptive strengths in the respective communities and the
intrapsychic processes of the clients/patients and/or families.").
238. For instance, one author reports on a patient who was harassed by his foreman
and persecuted by his fellow workers because he was black: "There was evidence that Mr.
A. was having problems in many areas. However, the main difficulty he presented was the
issue of race. The racial overtones in the situation seemed to shake his defensive structure
enough to cause intense anxiety and an irrational answer to a real situation." Thomas
Brantley, Racism and Its Impact on Psychotherapy, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1605, 1606
(1983). Mr. A. had decided to kill his foreman with a gun. Id.
Similarly, Grier and Cobbs's famous book BLACK RAGE refers to clients inordinately
affected by racism:
If the resources and imperfections of this young woman were unique to her,
her story would not assume such importance. Familiar concepts could adequately
describe her intrapsychic conflict. We would search her past for early trauma,
distorted relationships, and infantile conflicts. The social milieu from which she
came would be considered but would not be given much weight. Our youthful
subject, however, is black and this one fact transcends all others.
GRIER & COBBS, supra note 92, at 36.
239. ELLIS COSE, THE RAGE OF A PRIVILEGED CLASS (1993).
240. FEAGIN & SIKES, supra note 233.
241. Bragg, supra note 237, at 182; Carter, supra note 234, at 456; Billy E. Jones &
Beverly A. Gray, Problems in Diagnosing Schizophrenia and Affective Disorders Among
Blacks, 37 HOSP. & COMMUNrrY PSYCHIATRY 61, 62-63 (1986); Jeanne Spurlock, Black
Americans, in CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHIATRY, supra note 237, at 168; see also Charles A.
Pinderhughes, Understanding Black Power: Processes and Proposals, 125 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 106, 108 (1969) ("These group-related paranoid processes.., are responsible
for such extensive intrapsychic, interpersonal, and intergroup conflict .... acts of violence,
and deaths on a massive scale that psychiatrists may come to identify them as the most
serious pathogenic factors in our era.").
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harassment.242 Some authors question why more black individuals
do not display signs of psychiatric disorder given the prevalence of
racism within our society.43
In addition to psychiatric illness, research indicates that racism
impairs overall psychological functioning. From generalized notions
of emotional scarring to more specific responses of self-con-
2456tempt 4  and impaired intellectual and academic achievement,246
the effects of racism are multidimensional. Clark and Clark's classic
studies on the effect of institutionalized racism, in the form of school
segregation, merit consideration in this context.247 Their finding that
black children had lower self-esteem that might result in lower school
achievement was cited by the United States Supreme Court in Brown
v. Board of Education.'~
Third, the effects of racism may also have consequences for
physical health. Evidence from the medical literature suggests that
black individuals experience higher rates of high blood pressure and
coronary heart disease than do their white counterparts. 249 Resear-
242. Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story,
87 MICH. L. REV. 2320,2336 (1989); Andrea L. Crowley, Note, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul:
How the Supreme Court Missed the Writing on the Wall, 34 B.C. L. REV. 771, 777 (1993)
("In addition to the psychological ramifications of hate speech, victims also experience
physiological effects such as increased pulse rates, difficulty in breathing and post-traumatic
stress disorder.") (citing Matsuda, supra, at 2336); see also Angela E. Oh, Race Relations
in Los Angeles: "Divide and Conquer" is Alive and Flourishing, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1647,
1649 n.9 (1993) (noting that Korean-Americans suffered from PTSD following the Los
Angeles riots).
243. Benjamin P. Bowser, Racism and Mental Health: An Exploration of the Racist's
Illness and the Victim's Health, in INSTITUTIONAL RACISM AND COMMUNITY COMPETENCE
107, 107 (Barbarin et al. eds., 1981); see generally Bragg, supra note 237, at 183 (noting
that it is surprising that rate of mental disorders is not higher); Spurlock, supra note 241,
at 165 (noting that only some black individuals break down).
244. For an essay regarding the effects of racism on the black community, see ALVIN
F. POUSSAINT, WHY BLACKS KILL BLACKS 69 (1972); see also Carter, supra note 234, at
543 (noting anecdotally that an incident of racism had left the author himself emotionally
scarred).
245. See POUSSAINT, supra note 244, at 77; Matsuda, supra note 242, at 233740.
246. See Jeanne Spurlock, Some Consequences of Racism for Children, in RACISM AND
MENTAL HEALTH: ESSAYS 147, 153-54 (Charles V. Willie et al. eds., 1973).
247. Kenneth B. Clark & Mamie P. Clark, Racial Identification and Preference in Negro
Children, in READINGS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 602-11 (Eleanor E. Maccoby et al. eds.,
3d ed. 1958).
248. 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 n.11 (1954).
249. Richard Cooper, Blacks and ffypertension, 4 URB. HEALTH 9, 9 (1975); Ernest
Harburg et al., Socio-Ecological Stress, Suppressed Hostility, Skin Color, and Black-White
Male Blood Pressure: Detroit, 35 PSYCHOSOMATIC MED. 276, 276 (1973) (noting that
blacks have higher blood pressure levels, higher morbidity and mortality from hyperten-
sion, hypertensive heart disease, and stroke than white counterparts); Christopher Sempos
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chers have pointed to the role of racism and oppression as a possible
causative factor in this finding.2" The need to suppress frustration
and anger about unjust treatment may cause black individuals to turn
these feelings inward, possibly resulting in higher rates of hyperten-
sion and other medical conditions.
2. Causal Theories of the Effects of Racism
While some documentation supports the proposition that racism
plays a pathogenic role in causing some mental illness or psychological
impairment, it is not clear from the relevant research why this might
occur. Researchers in the field have offered a number of hypotheses.
Perhaps the simplest one is that racism is stressful for the persons
subjected to it." The stress for minority group members induced
by racism is greater than that experienced by other members of
society,152 a phenomenon Cash terms "extra-dimensional systemic
frustrations." 3  The results of stress are fairly well-known.' As
one commentator opined, "In the case of Blacks, extrapsychic sources
et al., Divergence of the Recent Trends in Coronary Mortality for the Four Major Race-Sex
Groups in the United States, 78 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1422, 1423 (1988) (finding that the
rapid decline in coronary heart disease has not slowed for white males, but has slowed for
females of both races and, to a lesser extent, black males); Hazel M. Swann, Guest
Editoriak A Feminist Look at Hypertension, 4 URB. HEALTH 10, 10 (1975).
250. Harburg et al., supra note 249, at 276-77 (hypothesizing that one possible
explanation for their finding is restricted anger or suppressed hostility); see also Sempos
et al., supra note 249, at 1425 ("Additionally, such factors as economic trends and
socioeconomic status or social class may also play a substantial role in changes in [coronary
heart disease] mortality trends.").
251. See, e.g., Ravetz, supra note 236, at 38 (positing that racism is stress-inducing); Jan
A. Buckner, Comment, Help Wanted:. An Expansive Definition of Constructive Discharge
Under Title VII, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 941, 964 (1988) (asserting that discrimination causes
stress with both mental and psychological consequences).
252. Joe R. Feagin, The Continuing Significance of Race: Antiblack Discrimination in
Public Places, 56 AM. Soc. REv. 101, 115 (1991) ("The individual cost of coping with
racial discrimination is great and, as he says, you cannot accomplish as much as you could
if you retained the energy wasted on discrimination."); Neighbors, supra note 234, at 173
(noting that it is commonly assumed that blacks experience more stress than whites
because of discrimination and prejudice); Spurlock, supra note 241, at 169 (noting that
Meers has discussed the "chronic external conflict and distress" experienced by black
individuals, who experience a "flood of unpredictable stimuli" and find the culture a
constant threat).
253. Cash, supra note 235, at 2 ("Because Black people have felt they must 'adjust' to
the alien (white originated) systems, these Black people have suffered 'extra-dimensional
systemic frustrations' to a greater degree than is true for the major (white group).").
254. For a summary of these consequences, see Buckner, supra note 251, at 961.
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of stress often lead to intrapsychic maladaptive behavior, that is, poor
self-concept, feelings of hopelessness, and rage." 5
The stress induced by racism operates on at least two levels: (1)
a system-wide derogation of members of the minority group, and (2)
the personal experiences of the individual. 6 Often, it is the
cumulative impact of both types of stresses that is so destructive and
explains why one precipitating event may seem trivial yet causes the
individual acute distress. The response to this stress is not the same
for all black persons.21 7 Individual differences in responsiveness to
the stresses produced by racism have been explored only slightly.
Some factors implicated in vulnerability to racism include degree of
community support, 258 personality, 29 and attitudes. 2 °
A second major mechanism through which racism may affect
mental health, in addition to causing stress, is to compromise the self-
esteem of individuals in the persecuted group. If racism is premised
upon the notion of racial superiority, it is not surprising that one
sequela is self-contempt on the part of minority-group members.2 61
Patricia Williams calls this effect "spirit murder., 262 This self-hatred
may lead to feelings of despair, depression, hopelessness, 263 and
helplessness. 21"
A third possible result of racism is the engendering of feelings of
frustration and rage that, in turn, may lead to aggressive or criminal
behavior.2 6  In discussing socially deviant and self-destructive
behavior on the part of black individuals, Houston observes: "Most
investigators, however, trace the problem to pent-up aggression
255. Elsie J. Smith, Cultural and Historical Perspectives in Counseling Blacks, in
COUNSELING THE CULTURALLY DIFFERENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 141, 173 (Derald
W. Sue ed., 1981).
256. See Feagin, supra note 252, at 114-15.
257. Bowser, supra note 243, at 111 ("Faced with the same oppressive conditions, some
blacks cope successfully while other do not."); Spurlock, supra note 241, at 165 ("The
foregoing accounts of psychological assaults daily mar the mental health of Black people.
Some will 'weather the storm.' Some will break down.").
258. Bowser, supra note 243, at 111.
259. Anthony Bottoms, Crime and Delinquency in Immigrant and Minority Groups, in
PSYCHOLOGY AND RACE 432, 449 (Peter Watson ed., 1973).
260. Id.
261. POUSSAINT, supra note 244, at 69; Matsuda, supra note 242, at 237-39; Crowley,
supra note 242, at 776.
262. Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of Fingerpointing
as the Law's Response to Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 127, 129 (1987).
263. Crowley, supra note 242, at 776.
264. Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets,
and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 133, 136-38 (1982).
265. Spurlock, supra note 241, at 171.
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caused by the frustration of being Black in White .Anerica."26 One
sociologist has even suggested that more subtle forms of racism within
our society are more pernicious because black individuals are lulled
into believing that the achievement of the American dream is at hand,
although severe obstacles actually prevent its attainment.267
3. The Need for Additional Research and the Role of Racism
While these reports from the various social and medical sciences
suggest an impact of racism on mental and physical health and
psychological functioning, considerable additional systematic,
empirical research is needed in this area. Some social scientists blame
racism within the various professions as partially responsible for the
lack of research." These allegations of racism exist in the
psychiatric,269 psychological,2 7' and medical 7  literature. Thus,
266. LAWRENCE N. HOUSTON, PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES AND THE BLACK
EXPERIENCE 130 (1990).
267. FEAGIN & SIKES, supra note 233, at ix; see also HOUSTON, supra note 266, at 147
("The frustrations, tensions, and conflicts involved in constantly attempting to meet one's
needs and achieve one's goals in a limited opportunity structure seem to be taking their
toll on Black Americans.").
268. See POUSSAINT, supra note 244, at 69 ("Regrettably, social scientists have
cooperated with a system which defines blacks in negative terms but disguises them in
academic jargon"); Smith, supra note 255, at 141 (noting that Martin Luther King once
said that social scientists have played little or no role in disclosing the truth about the
plight of minorities in this country).
269. With respect to psychiatry, one author comments:
What impact this racism has had on the mind of man cannot yet be fully
known, since research dealing with racism has been underrepresented as a
proportion of the total work in the mental health field. Frequently, racial aspects
of mental health have been either ignored or underplayed to the point of
abandonment.
James R. Ralph, Foreword to INSTITUTIONAL RACISM AND COMMUNITY COMPETENCE
at iii (Oscar A. Barbarin et al. eds., 1981); see also ALEXANDER THOMAS & SAMUEL
SILLEN, RACISM AND PSYCHIATRY at v (1972) (noting racism in the mental health field);
Carter, supra note 228, at 544 (noting racism in the mental health field and the American
Psychiatric Association's response); Kenneth B. Clark, Foreword to THOMAS & SILLEN,
supra, at xii (discussing the fact that social scientists "are no more immune by virtue of
their values and training to the disease and superstitions of American racism than is the
average man"); Ezra E. H. Griffith & Elwin J. Griffith, Racism, Psychological Injury, and
Compensatory Damages, 37 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 71, 71 (1986) (noting that
"mental health professionals have not studied the psychological effects of racism in much
detail"); Spurlock, supra note 241, at 164 (quoting from Kramer to the effect that mental
health professionals are not immune to racism); Charles B. Wilkinson & Jeanne Spurlock,
The Mental Health of Black Americans: Psychiatric Diagnosis and Treatment, in ETHNIC
PSYCHIATRY 13, 15 (Charles B. Wilkinson ed., 1986) (positing that many of the
inaccuracies in the diagnosis of black patients are related to racism).
270. Thomas 0. Hilliard, Applications of Psychology and the Criminal Justice System:
A Black Perspective, in BLACK PSYCHOLOGY 456, 456-57 (Reginald L. Jones ed., 2d ed.
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racism in the research process itself may be partially responsible for
the lack of a better-developed body of work on the effects of racism
on mental and physical health.
4. Discussion
The major criticism of the social science literature on the effects
of racism is the dearth of systematic, empirical studies. A con-
siderable portion of the social science in this area is anecdotal, based
on clinical accounts, or simply underdeveloped. While such infor-
mation provides a valuable starting point for further investigation, it
must be followed by more rigorous data collection and empirically-
oriented techniques. To some extent, the embryonic nature of
research on the effects of racism is reminiscent of early research on
Vietnam veterans, battered women, and rape victims, which was later
substantiated by more rigorous and systematic studies.
D. The Cumulative Impact of These Social Toxins
While this section has considered the social science research
underlying the three theories of defense seriatim, one final note
regarding their cumulative impact is necessary. However virulent the
social toxins of real-life violence, television violence, and racism may
be in and of themselves, in combination they provide an even more
powerful causal explanation for psychological dysfunction, mental
illness, and ultimately criminal behavior. For instance, Garbarino
emphasizes individuals' heightened vulnerability to psychological
damage when they must cope with multiple social toxins:
1980) ("[T]here are severe problems and limitations in theories, methodologies, and
research conclusions of psychology as they pertain to black people. More specifically, the
discipline of psychology's relationship to the black community is characterized by racism,
insensitivity, gross distortion and inappropriate methodologies."); see also Peter Watson,
Psychologists and Race: The 'Actor Factor', Introduction to PSYCHOLOGY AND RACE,
supra note 259, at 13 (noting racism within psychology).
271. Writing about the medical profession, one physician observes:
The pieces are all there. We are left, however, with "guilt by association," which
is repeatedly denied by the academic community. The specific experiment to
correlate the general, epidemiological findings with chronic psychological and
physiological changes is missing. Most importantly, the cause should be
eliminated in a control population. Unfortunately, neither of those experiments
will be undertaken in a class society. The National Institute of Health is not
likely to fund a grant to eliminate racism and class oppression from the south
side of Chicago.
Cooper, supra note 249, at 39.
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As the social environment becomes more socially toxic
it is the most vulnerable kids who show the effects first....
[It is] the children who have accumulated the most develop-
mental risk factors... [such as having] a single parent, being
poor, being the victim of racism, being burdened with drug
addiction or alcoholism, and suffering problems that impair
parenting....
Children become more vulnerable as risk factors
accumulate ... to the social toxicity that surrounds them.
Where? In the seductive world of television, in the nastiness
that results from declining public civility, in the stresses of
the modem economy, and in the violence that escalates in
many communities.'
More specifically, some social scientists have documented the
interactive effects of real-life violence and television violence,273
while others have linked the impact of racism and the experience of
real-life violence.274 In terms of criminal defenses, Delgado has
constructed a new independent defense of "rotten secial background"
(RSB), borrowing Judge Bazelon's phrase from Alexander,27 which
subsumes a number of these social toxins under one theoretical
rubric.2
7 6
E. Conclusion
The empirical and theoretical social science support for the three
theories of defense varies to some degree. At one end of the
spectrum, considerable empirical and psychiatric research exists for
the notion that experiencing or witnessing real-life violence-the
central claim of urban psychosis--can have deleterious psychological
consequences. In the middle of the continuum, the social science
regarding the effects of television violence-which underlies the
television intoxication defense-is controversial but social scientists
have achieved some measure of consensus on the central proposition
272. Garbarino, Growing Up, supra note 10, at 7-8 (emphasis added).
273. DuRant et al., supra note 162, at 612; Widom, supra note 183, at 23 (reporting that
Heath et al. found an interaction between large amounts of television viewing and
exposure to parental abuse which resulted in violent crime); see also Shirk, supra note 185,
at 1A (stating that television violence is one factor feeding children's fears, in addition to
their more general fear that the world is becoming more dangerous).
274. DuRant et al., supra note 162, at 612 (noting that violence disproportionally
involves minority youth); Shakoor & Chalmers, supra note 186, at 236.
275. United States v. Alexander, 47f F.2d 923, 960 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, J.,
dissenting), cert denied, 409 U.S. 1044 (1972).
276. Delgado, supra note 5, at 23-37.
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that violent television programming is correlated with aggressive
behavior. The social science literature on the psychological sequelae
of racism-the scientific premise of black rage-is on the far end of
the spectrum with far too little systematic empirical research, although
what is available supports the defense.
While these three areas of social science research are not
developed to the same degree, in each area sufficient research exists
to meet threshold evidentiary requirements under the federal court
standard of Federal Rule of Evidence 702.277 Thus, sufficient social
science support exists for these three theories of defense so that they
merit consideration within the context of the criminal law.278
277. Rule 702 states: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." FED. R. EVID. 702. Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993), interpreted Rule 702 and held that the rule
supersedes the "general acceptance" standard of Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.
Cir. 1923), in the federal courts. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2794. The Frye standard, which
may still apply in jurisdictions not utilizing the federal rules, provides:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this
twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while
courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-
recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction
is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the
particular field in which it belongs.
Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
278. The information which lies at the heart of the urban psychosis cases, that real-life
violence significantly affects individuals' mental health, is not only widely accepted among
social scientists, but has already been admitted into evidence in other types of cases. See,
e.g., State v. Janes, 822 P.2d 1238 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (battered child); State v. Kelly,
478 A.2d 364 (N.J. 1984) (battered woman); State v. Felde, 422 So. 2d 370 (La. 1982)
(Vietnam veteran); State v. Marks, 647 P.2d 1292 (Kan. 1982) (rape victim).
Empirical research establishing a link between television violence and subsequent
aggressive behavior, while controversial, is almost unanimously accepted in the scientific
community as exemplified by recent government and social science reports. See supra
notes 209-11. Thus, social science on television violence also meets threshold admissibility
requirements in terms of degree of acceptance and development. The harder evidentiary
question which arises concerning this research is relevance: Is the research relevant to a
mental state of significance to the criminal law? Federal Rules of Evidence 401 defines
relevant evidence as "any evidence having any tendency to make the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R.
EVID. 401. Under this very liberal standard, research on television violence may be
admitted to assist the jury by providing a broader context in which to evaluate the
defendant's mental state.
The hardest question of admissibility concerns the social science on the negative
effects of racism because it is the least developed of the three areas. General consensus,
however, exists among social scientists that racism psychologically damages individuals
exposed to it; no contrary empirical evidence detracts from this conclusion. Thus, while
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III. URBAN PSYCHOSIS, TELEVISION INTOXICATION,
AND BLACK RAGE FIT WITHIN THE EXISTING
STRUCTURE OF CRIMINAL DOCTRINE
This Part addresses the question of whether urban psychosis,
television intoxication, and black rage as theories of defense can be
accommodated within the existing structure of the criminal law. The
analysis of cases in Part I demonstrated that defendants did not
proffer these theories as new and independent defenses but, rather,
used them to support existing categories of defense, to avoid or
alleviate guilt, or to mitigate punishment. While the underlying
theoretical and empirical premises of these theories may be novel,
based on the social science reviewed in Part II, these three defense
theories are simply modem variations of doctrinal categories of
defense that have evolved throughout the history of criminal law.
The following discussion focuses on the four most common uses,
as exemplified in Part I, of the defense theories of urban psychosis,
television intoxication, and black rage within the doctrinal framework
of the criminal law: (1) to support an insanity defense; (2) to
elucidate other mental states relevant to criminal responsibility such
as diminished capacity and provocation; (3) to support a claim of self-
defense; and (4) to play a mitigating role in sentencing, especially with
respect to the death penalty. In each of these areas, the theories can
be subsumed within the existing structure of the criminal law without
major substantive innovation or expansion.
A caveat is necessary before proceeding. The legal literature
pertaining to these four doctrinal categories and to the death penalty
is extraordinarily immense, complex, and intellectually diverse; the
following discussion is therefore necessarily general. The limited
purpose of this inquiry is to consider the degree of correspondence
between the social science literature reviewed in Part II and existing
trends within criminal jurisprudence, and not to explore the nuances
of these individual categories of defense and mitigation.
underdeveloped, the social science is unidirectional in documenting psychiatric and
psychological harm to the victims of racism. In addition, the United States Supreme Court
has already incorporated some social science evidence on the negative effects of racism in
its famous school desegregation opinion, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494-
95 n.11 (1954). The social science research on racism's impact is even better developed
since Brown, although further empirical inquiry is still necessary.
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A. Guilt Determination" Exculpation and Mitigation
1. The Insanity Defense: An Excuse Defense
The most common use of these three theories is to support an
insanity defense. Defendants in ten of the eighteen studied cases
argued that the social environmental toxins of real-life violence, media
violence, and persistent racism had caused them to become legally
insane. For instance, Morgan mounted an insanity defense based on
urban psychosis,279 Zamora claimed that his insanity resulted from
excessive viewing of television violence,' and Gilchrist argued that
he was driven insane by the persistent racism that he encountered." t
In his thoughtful, systematic analysis of criminal defenses,
Robinson classifies the insanity defense as an excuse, which "admit[s]
that the deed may be wrong, but excuse[s] the actor because
conditions suggest that the actor is not responsible for his deed."'
In the case of the insanity defense, the actor is considered not
responsible due to mental illness. The insanity defense has two basic
requirements. First, the defendant must have a mental disability,
generally characterized as a mental disease or defect. Second, that
mental condition must have rendered the defendant incapable of
certain cognitive awareness or volitional control at the time of the
criminal conduct.' The two most common versions of the insanity
defense are the M'Naghten test,' a purely cognitive standard, and
279. See supra notes 20-27 and accompanying text.
280. See supra notes 46-67 and accompanying text.
281. See supra notes 153-61 and accompanying text; see also Delgado, supra note 5, at
41 (reporting on one attorney's use of black rage to support an insanity defense by
combining "(1) general psychological principles, (2) the client's upbringing, problems and
strengths, and (3) the historical-sociological experience of a Black person in America").
282. Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82 CoLUM. L.
REv. 199, 221 (1982).
283. Id.
284. Robinson, supra note 282, at 222.
285. The M'Naghten test is as follows:
[T]o establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that,
at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was labouring under
such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and
quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was
doing what was wrong.
M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843). A few jurisdictions using the M'Naghten
rule supplement it with the irresistible impulse test, a volitional test. LAFAVE & SCOTT,
supra note 228, at 310-11.
[V/ol. 74
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the Model Penal Code (MPC) test, which contains both cognitive and
volitional prongs. 6
With respect to the requirement of a mental disease or defect,
the primary problem encountered in these cases was the failure of the
courts to distinguish between the cause of insanity and the resulting
mental state. The particular pathogenesis of a defendant's insanity is
largely irrelevant if he can meet the requisite elements of the
jurisdiction's insanity standard. As one of the attorneys in these cases
put it: "[T]he urban psychosis defense is not a radical departure from
the traditional insanity defense. 'The only difference is that I argued
that the diseases Felicia suffered were caused environmentally' rather
than by genetics, drugs, or other factors ... ."' At least one
appellate court recognized this distinction, however: "Zamora argues
that Rubin made a mockery of his insanity defense by alleging that it
was caused by 'television intoxication' even though the cause of
insanity is irrelevant to the defense itself"'
The social science literature reviewed in Part II substantiates that
the social toxins of real-life violence and racism have been shown to
cause a variety of mental illnesses in certain individuals. The most
common mental illness associated with the experience of real-life
violence is PTSD. 89 In the context of racism, clinical accounts and
data exist to support the notion that some individuals are so gravely
affected by the experience of racism that mental illness results.2 0
In terms of the television research, the link between viewing violent
television programming and causation of a particular mental illness is
more attenuated, although one report exists of two children who
developed PTSD after watching a frightening movie.29 However,
by analogy to involuntary intoxication cases, it could be argued that
the intoxicating qualities of television violence rendered the defendant
legally insane.29
286. The Model Penal Code test provides: "A person is not responsible for criminal
conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks
substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or
to conform his conduct to the requirements of law." MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1)
(1962).
287. Shoop, supra note 9, at 13 (quoting Shellow, the attorney for Morgan).
288. Zamora v. Dugger, 834 F.2d 956, 959 (11th Cir. 1987) (emphasis added.).
289. See supra notes 166-82 and accompanying text.
290. See supra notes 234-43 and accompanying text.
291. Mihill, supra note 232, at 3.
292. See LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 228, at 393-94. Involuntary intoxication is a
defense if the actor meets the jurisdiction's insanity test. Id.
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A second problem associated with the use of these three theories
in support of an insanity defense is the question of what constitutes
a mental disease or defect. Joshua Dressier notes a lack of specificity
in the legal standard in this regard: "Perhaps because of the
psychiatric community's inability or unwillingness to define the term
'mental disorder' as used in its scientific inquiry, courts and legis-
latures have been reluctant to define the phrase in the context of the
insanity defense."'293 On one hand, this lack of specificity has led
some courts to emphasize the need for a psychotic-like mental
state,2" although the requirement of psychosis295 is not embodied
in the legal standard. As Chief Judge Bazelon wrote in Alexander:
[O]ur experience has made it clear that the terms we
use-"mental disease or defect" and "abnormal condition of
the mind"--carry a distinct flavor of pathology. And they
deflect attention from the crucial, functional question-did
the defendant lack the ability to make any meaningful choice
of action-to an artificial and misleading excursion into a
thicket of psychiatric diagnosis and nomenclature.29 6
On the other hand, courts often defer to the psychiatric com-
munity's assessment of whether a mental illness exists, particularly in
the guise of its diagnostic schemata-the DSM-III.29  Notably,
many of the defendants involved in the studied cases displayed mental
illness contained in the DSM-III; for instance, Ferguson was most
likely schizophrenic298 and Gilchrist was arguably in the throes of a
psychotic episode.9 Further, the recognition of PTSD as a
category of mental illness may also lay the groundwork for an insanity
defense premised upon one of these three defense theories3" since
293. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 298 (1987).
294. See, e.g., United States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923, 958 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon,
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1044 (1973) (noting that, although psychosis is not
literally required for a finding of mental illness, mental illness as a legal term of art
includes "any abnormal condition of the mind that substantially affects mental or
emotional processes and substantially impairs behavior controls").
295. Perhaps Shellow, Morgan's attorney, coined the term "urban psychosis," see supra
note 20, because she recognized that this designation sounded more acceptable than PTSD.
296. Alexander, 471 F.2d at 960-61 (Bazelon, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
297. For a discussion of the DSM-III, see supra note 13 and accompanying text.
298. See KUNSTLER & ISENBERG, supra note 115, at 386.
299. Langner, supra note 156, at 25.
300. But at least one social scientist disagrees:
There is no question that a clinical entity called post-traumatic stress disorder
exists .... The question is what we will recognize as a stressor. Watching
television or living in an urban environment are not likely to count. Being raped
or battered by a spouse are much more circumscribed and definable events.
[Vol. 74
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Vietnam veterans and battered women have already successfully
mounted insanity defenses based upon an underlying mental illness of
PTSD.
In addition to the requirement of a mental disease or defect, that
mental condition must produce what Robinson terms an "excusing
condition" that results in the criminal behavior.3 01  Robinson
describes four types of excusing conditions that will provide the basis
for an excuse defense: (1) when the conduct is "not the product of
the actor's voluntary effort or determination," (2) when the conduct
is voluntary, but the defendant "does not accurately perceive the
physical nature or consequences of the conduct," (3) when perception
is not impaired, but the defendant "does not know that the conduct
or its results are wrong or criminal," and (4) when perception and
cognition are not impaired, but the defendant "lacks the ability to
control his conduct. ',31 The claims made by defendants in the
studied cases easily fit within Robinson's four-part schema, requiring
no additional innovation.30 3
Shoop, supra note 9, at 12-13 (quoting John Monahan, a psychologist and law professor
at the University of Virginia); see supra section II.A.3.
301. According to Robinson:
Having a recognized disability at the time of the offense will not alone qualify an
actor for an excuse, for it is not the disability that is central to our reason for
exculpating the defendant. An actor is not excused because he or she is
intoxicated, but because the effect of the intoxication in this instance is to create
a condition which renders the actor blameless for his conduct constituting the
offense. The requirement of an excusing condition, then, is not an element
independent of the actor's disability, but rather a requirement that the actor's
disability cause a particular result, a particular exculpating mental condition in
relation to the conduct constituting the offense.
Robinson, supra note 282, at 221-22 (footnote omitted).
302. Id. at 222. Robinson also notes that these four conditions are presented in
decreasing order of severity. Id at 225. It is easiest to make a case for a disability under
the absence-of-volition criterion and hardest under the lack-of-control criterion. Id. at
225-26. This latter excuse is only accepted if "a clear, confirmable almost compelling
disability" exists, and if the impairment is "of a certain degree. . . sufficiently serious that
the actor has, at least temporarily, entered the realm of abnormality." Id at 225-26.
303. Only one case might arguably fall under Robinson's first category, primarily
reserved for reflex actions and convulsions. See id at 223. In Zamora v. State, 361 So.
2d 776, 779 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied, 372 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 1979), the
defendant's insanity defense was based upon "involuntary subliminal television
intoxication," i.e., that his act in shooting his elderly neighbor was a conditioned reflex
based upon his inordinate consumption of violent television programming. See supra notes
46-67.
The second category of Robinson's schema, perceptual impairment resulting typically
from insanity or intoxication (and also covering the defenses of automatism and
somnambulism), Robinson, supra note 282, at 223, might encompass at least two of the
cases. The defendants in Zamora, 361 So. 2d 776, and Fisher, 149 F.2d 28 (D.C. Cir. 1945),
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In summary, the use of these theories to support an insanity
defense requires little substantive expansion with respect to es-
tablished criminal law doctrine. While none of the ten defendants
raising this defense was found not guilty by reason of insanity,3" this
fact relates to the respective jury's determination rather than any
doctrinal obstacle. In other words, nothing in the legal doctrine
precludes the recognition of an insanity defense based on any of these
three possible causal agents?'
2. Diminished Capacity and Provocation:
Failure-of-Proof Defenses
Defendants in the studied cases used the theories of urban
psychosis, television intoxication, and black rage for a second major
purpose: to elucidate mental states, short of insanity, relevant to the
criminal law, such as diminished capacity and provocation. According
to Robinson's schema of criminal defenses, both diminished capacity
affd, 328 U.S. 463 (1946), had little conscious awareness of their death-producing acts.
RUBIN & MATERA, supra note 46, at 56. In Taylor, see supra notes 28-34 and accom-
panying text, a case which did not implicate the insanity defense but seems to raise a
similar decisional impairment, the defendant experienced a flashback at the time he killed
the victim.
Robinson's third category, defects in knowledge or reason, includes insanity and
intoxication as well as mistake. This might be another category in which to place the
television-intoxication cases. Here, the defendant has difficulty separating the reality of
the situation at hand from the fictionalized accounts of violence on television because of
a defect "either in the perception of the nature of the act or in the intelligent evaluation
of its wrongfulness or criminality." Robinson, supra note 282, at 223.
Several cases might fall in Robinson's fourth category, lack of volitional control,
which can result from insanity, intoxication, or duress. For instance, in United States v.
Alexander, 471 F.2d 923, 926 (D.C. Cir. 1973), one of the defendants claimed to have lost
control when called by a racial epithet. Similar arguments might be made for Ferguson
and Gilchrist. However, in order for this to be a relevant consideration, the jurisdiction
must recognize either the MPC insanity test, which has a volitional prong, or the
irresistible impulse test.
304. The case in which the insanity defense appeared to come closest to success was
Gilchrist's, see supra notes 153-61, in which the jury was out for five days. Ex-Stockbroker
found Guilty of First-Degree Murder, UPI, Apr. 17, 1989, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Wires File.
305. The use of these three theories to support an insanity defense is also unremarkable
in another respect: expert testimony regarding insanity is common and even traditional.
See David McCord, Syndromes, Profiles and Other Mental Exotica.: A New Approach to
the Admissibility of Nontraditional Psychological Evidence in Criminal Cases, 66 OR. L.
REv. 19, 23 (1987) ("Lawyers have utilized psychological testimony on the sanity of
defendants for decades with no serious challenges to the admissibility of the substance of
the testimony.") (footnote omitted).
[Vol. 74
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and provocation may be conceptualized as failure-of-proof defen-
ses,306 which "consist of instances in which, because of the conditions
that are the basis for the 'defense,' all elements of the offense charged
cannot be proven."3" Diminished capacity and provocation negate
the mental element of an offense. Theoretically, if an element of the
offense is negated, then the defendant should be acquitted. However,
as Robinson points out in discussing diminished capacity:
[M]any offenses, especially homicide offenses, have lesser
included offenses with less demanding culpability elements.
Thus mental illness may negate the culpability element of
the greater offense but not of the lesser offense. When this
occurs, the net effect of the mental illness is to reduce the
defendant's liability from the greater to the lesser. (This is
also what occurs in the failure of proof defense of
provocation, which is said to negate the required malice
element of murder, and thereby reduces the defendant's
liability to manslaughter.) 8
Thus, diminished capacity and provocation function more commonly
as theories of mitigation than as complete exculpatory defenses.30 9
a. Diminished Capacity
The one case discussed in Part I that directly raised the issue of
diminished capacity was United States v. Fisher.31 Fisher claimed
that he suffered from a mental illness not amounting to insanity,
which negated the premeditation or deliberation necessary for first-
degree murder and that he should therefore be guilty of a lesser
offense" Similarly, Murdock, who raised an insanity defense, also
requested a jury instruction on diminished capacity, but the court
306. See Robinson, supra note 282, at 242. Robinson also believes that provocation can
function as an offense modification. Id. at 233. Dressler discusses provocation as either
a partial justification or partial excuse and concludes that the better classification is as a
partial excuse. DRESSLER, supra note 293, at 474-75.
307. Id. at 204.
308. Id. at 206 (footnotes omitted).
309. Dressler points out that diminished capacity actually encompasses "two categories
of circumstances in which a defendant's abnormal mental condition, short of insanity, will
exonerate him, or more often, result in his conviction of a crime or degree of crime less
serious than the original charge." DRESSLER, supra note 293, at 319. First, diminished
capacity functions as an all-purpose mens rea defense and, second, some states recognize
a separate "partial responsibility" defense, but only in murder cases.
310. 149 F.2d 28 (D.C. Cir. 1945), 328 U.S. 463 (1946); see also LAFAVE & SCOTT,
supra note 228, at 370 (arguing that Fisher was wrongly decided and lacked current vitality
in light of United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
311. Fisher, 149 F.2d at 29.
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refused it.312 On appeal, Morgan claimed that due to urban
psychosis she did not have the intent to kill and that expert testimony
to that effect had been improperly excluded at the guilt phase of the
trial.313 Outside the courtroom, Morgan's attorney specifically
advocated the use of urban psychosis to support a claim of diminished
capacity, commenting that "the urban-psychosis defense could be
particularly useful in states where defendants are allowed to plead
'diminished capacity,' a mental disturbance less severe than in-
sanity." 4 Finally, attorneys in Gilchrist intimated that they might
argue diminished capacity on appeal.315
In brief, diminished capacity or partial responsibility is based on
the notion that the defendant has a mental illness or distur-
bance-falling short of the test for legal insanity-that renders her
unable to form the intent necessary for the charged offense.316 By
definition, then, the degree of impairment of the defendant's mental
state is less severe than in cases of insanity.
The three defense theories of urban psychosis, television
intoxication, and black rage easily fit within the doctrinal category of
diminished capacity. The social science in support of these theories,
reviewed in Part II, indicates that the social toxins of real-life
violence, television violence, and racism may cause psychological
dysfunction short of full-blown mental illness or legal insanity, yet still
have a significant effect on the individual's behavior. In his discussion
of the new defense of rotten social background (RSB), Delgado
emphasizes that diminished capacity is well-suited for some RSB
cases:
To the extent that the diminished capacity defense does
not require a mental illness so severe as that required by the
insanity pleas, it better accommodates emotional disability
caused by RSB. It is easier to argue that temporary
psychological disorders, such as transient situational distur-
bance, or post-traumatic stress syndrome, diminish one's
capacity rather than render one insane.1
312. United States v. Alexander & Murdock, 471 F.2d 923, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1044 (1973).
313. Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 7, State v. Morgan (1994) (No. 93-2611-CR) (on
file with the author).
314. Woo, supra note 21, at B1.
315. Wong, Gilchrist Convicted, supra note 153, at 1.
316. DRESSLER, supra note 293, at 319; LAFAVE & SCoTr, supra note 228, at 368.
317. Delgado, supra note 5, at 44 (footnotes omitted).
[Vol. 74790
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While "the logic of the partial responsibility doctrine would seem
to be unassailable, 3 18 it has not been widely accepted.319  One
common rationale for rejecting the doctrine is the lack of confidence
in mental health experts' ability to determine degrees of insanity or
disability."2 However, as Dressier points out: "The fact that D's
lack-of-mens-rea claim is based on expert testimony that he suffered
from a mental illness should not affect the legal analysis." '321 A
second objection is that, "[p]sychiatric testimony aside, line-drawing
concerns some: if this defense is recognized why are other forms of
mitigation, such as economic adversity, not recognized?" 3"
As with the insanity defense, defendants attempting to utilize one
of these three theories of defense to argue diminished capacity were
not successful. However, part of this failure appears to relate to the
questionable standing of this doctrinal category, rather than with the
underlying empirical claims of these defendants. One possible benefit
of a more careful consideration of these three theories of defense may
be to reinvigorate discussion of diminished capacity as a distinct and
viable category of defense.
b. Provocation
Three of the eighteen cases discussed in Part I addressed the
issue of provocation. Justice Frankfurter, in his dissenting opinion in
Fisher,3" one of the cases also raising diminished capacity, asserted
that Fisher's conduct could be understood as the result of the
provocation engendered by the victim's use of a racial epithet.324
Similarly, in State v. Hall, the dissenting judge reasoned that the
defendant had made a sufficient showing of provocation, based on the
victim's use of a racial epithet, that the trial judge should have
318. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 228, at 374. The authors continue: "The reception
of evidence of the defendant's abnormal mental condition, totally apart from the defense
of insanity, is certainly appropriate whenever that evidence is relevant to the issue of
whether he had the mental state which is a necessary element of the crime charged." Id.
(footnotes omitted).
319. DRESSLER, supra note 293, at 319; LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 228, at 368-77.
320. DRESSLER, supra note 293, at 323-24, 327; LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 228, at
374-75.
321. DRESSLER, supra note 293, at 321.
322. I. at 327.
323. Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 490 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see
supra notes 120-33 and accompanying text.
324. Id. at 480-81 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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instructed thereon.3 s In Hall, the theory of provocation could have
mitigated the crime from attempted murder to aggravated assault 2 6
Finally, provocation arguably played a role in Taylor, 27 one of the
urban-psychosis cases, in which the defendant was permitted to plead
guilty to a lesser degree of homicide after the trial judge ruled that
evidence of PTSD would be admissible. Taylor claimed that the
threatening conduct of a male sexual partner precipitated a flashback
to a gang-rape in prison, during which he killed the victim. While
these three cases addressed the issue of provocation directly, several
other cases,328 particularly in the black rage category, arguably fall
into this doctrinal category because they demonstrate a connection
between a mental state engendered by a strong external stimulus, such
as racial epithets and discriminatory acts, and the defendant's
subsequent behavior.
Provocation was designed as a concession to human frailty in
general. 29 The defendant's claim is that he did not have complete
volitional control because of some legally-sufficient form of
provocation. That is, certain stimuli can be so powerful that an
average individual would be so disturbed that he would temporarily
lose control of his ability to behave within the confines of the criminal
law. LaFave and Scott describe provocation in the context of
voluntary manslaughter as "the intentional killing of another while
under the influence of a reasonably-induced emotional disturbance (in
earlier terminology, while in a 'heat of passion') causing a temporary
loss of normal self-control. 30  In contrast to both the insanity
defense and diminished capacity, which are based upon some form of
mental illness, the assumption underlying provocation is that the
defendant is mentally normal, not aberrational, and that the
emotional disturbance is temporary rather than permanent. Rage is
325. Hall, No. 60898,1992 WL 181709, at *7 (Ohio App. 8 Dist. July 30,1992) (Harper,
J., dissenting); see supra notes 142-47 and accompanying text.
326. Id. at *4 (Harper, J., dissenting).
327. See supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
328. Additionally, in the gangsta rap case, Howard, see supra notes 86-91, the defendant
killed a police officer while listening to music advocating that very act. Munn, supra note
86, at 477. In Boney, the defendant may have received a fairly light sentence for his crime
because of a provocation-like mitigating factor. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying
text.
329. The quintessential example of this is a homicide committed upon discovering one's
spouse in bed with another person. LAFAvE & ScoTr, supra note 228, at 656.
330, Id at 654.
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the most common form of emotional disturbance under the rubric of
provocation, although other intense emotions may qualify
33
'
The use of urban psychosis, television intoxication, and black rage
to furnish the underlying basis for provocation raises a number of
questions. The first question is what qualifies as adequate or legally-
sufficient provocation. A second question is to what extent this
standard should be determined subjectively. Third, the requirement
that the defendant must not have "cooled off" merits exploration in
the context of these defense theories.
Although the common law rule was that mere words were
insufficient provocation, that rule has changed over time.332 Inflam-
matory comments such as racial epithets may be sufficient.333
Furthermore, several courts in other contexts have stated that racial
epithets may constitute "fighting words" given their highly-charged,
emotional content. 4 In the same way, acts of racial discrimination
may qualify as sufficiently provocative to meet the threshold
standard.335
The second issue is whether the provocation must be viewed from
an objective, reasonable-person standard or whether the subjective
characteristics of the defendant should be considered. LaFave and
Scott suggest that courts have been increasingly willing to take more
subjective criteria into account.336 Similarly, Dressler notes: "The
331. Id.; DRESSLER, supra note 293, at 476 ("Although anger may be the emotion most
often experienced by a person who raises the provocation defense any 'violent, intense,
high-wrought, or enthusiastic emotion' suffices." (quoting People v. Borchers, 325 P.2d 97,
102 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1958) (citation omitted))).
332. LAFAVE & SCOTr, supra note 228, at 657.
333. See, eg., State v. Grugin, 47 S.W. 1058 (Mo. 1898) (discussing cases in which words
were held to be legally sufficient provocation). "No sound distinction, can, it seems, be
taken in principle between insult offered by acts and that offered by foul and opprobrious
words." Id. at 1064. Delgado emphasizes the powerful impact of racial insults in arguing
for a tort action based thereon: "Without question, mere words, whether racial or
otherwise, case cause mental, emotional, or even physical harm to their target, especially
if delivered in front of others or by a person in a position of authority." Delgado, supra
note 264, at 143 (citations omitted).
334. E.g., State v. Harrington, 680 P.2d 666, 669 (1984); Downs v. State, 351 A.2d 166
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 366 A.2d 41 (Md. 1976). For a
discussion of the nature of racial epithets, particularly the word "nigger," see Lee v.
Ventura County Superior Court, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 763, 765 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992)
("Appellant [who wanted to legally change his name to Misteri Nigger] has no statutory
right to court approval of a name that by his own theory is a racial epithet which provokes
violence.").
335. Cf Delgado, supra note 264, at 33-34 (discussing effects of discriminatory conduct).
336. The authors comment: "It has been persuasively argued that at least some
individual peculiarities should be taken into account 'because they bear upon the inference
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modem trend is to permit the jury to consider at least some of the
characteristics of the defendant in its evaluation of the reasonableness
of her conduct. 33 7 The importance of a subjective determination
of provocation was underscored by the dissenting judge in one black-
rage case:
Racial insults should not be a topic of objective analysis, but
a subjective determination, bearing in mind the surrounding
circumstances and the individual's frame of mind. It is like
analyzing a case of a battered woman syndrome, provocation
is looked at from the totality of the circumstances including
the history of abuse. A complete understanding of the
situation can be made manifest only when there is an inquiry
beyond the immediate incident.338
While the trend has been for courts to consider more subjective
characteristics of the defendant under the rubric of provocation, it is
not clear whether a personal history plagued by real-life violence, as
in Taylor; heightened fear engendered by an urban environment, as
in Boney,39 or the "withering effect of racism,"3" as in Fisher and
Hall, are pertinent factors. In this regard, Dressler has noted a
tendency for courts to incorporate gender as a viable characteris-
tic;341 he also raises the issue of cultural difference in the following
hypothetical:
[S]uppose that D, a recent immigrant to this country,
becomes enraged when he observes V, as young male, hug
his teenage daughter. It can be proved at trial that V's act
was highly provocative to a person with D's cultural back-
ground; to the average American, however, it would not
constitute adequate provocation. The level of D's criminal
responsibility will depend, therefore, on whether we measure
his homicidal response to V's act by the standard of the
ordinary American or by that of the ordinary person with his
cultural background. 4
as to the actor's character that it is fair to draw upon the basis of his act.' " LAFAVE &
SCOTr, supra note 228, at 660.
337. DRESSLER, supra note 293, at 481.
338. State v. Hall, No. 60898, 1992 WL 181709, at *7 (Ohio App. 8 Dist. July 30,1992)
(Harper, J., dissenting).
339. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
340. Pierce, supra note 234, at 512.
341. DRESSLER, supra note 293, at 481.
342. Id. at 480.
[Vol. 74
HeinOnline  -- 74 N.C. L. Rev.  794 1995-1996
1996] NOVEL THEORIES OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE 795
The Model Penal Code's "extreme mental or emotional distur-
bance" standard contains both objective and subjective elements. 43
Due to the more explicitly subjective nature of the MPC standard, the
defendant may be better able to introduce evidence, such as that
encapsulated in one of the three theories of defense, to explain her
behavior at the time of the criminal act.3 With respect to the RSB
defense, Delgado argues that the MPC's formulation would permit the
adequacy of the instigating circumstances to be judged from the
defendant's perspective rather than that of a middle-class judge or
juror.345
A final doctrinal obstacle under the provocation law regards the
existence of a cooling-off period. If the defendant had the oppor-
tunity to cool off, then she may not avail herself of the mitigating
effect of provocation.3" "However, a more realistic appraisal of
how human emotions work compels the conclusion-which some
courts have reached-that a reasonable provocation can be produced
by a series of events occurring over a considerable span of time."347
Thus, a long history of racial discrimination or oppression might
arguably qualify as provocation. As the court in Hall observed, it is
necessary to understand the defendant's conduct as the result of a
longer series of events rather than as the result of the events
immediately preceding the criminal act."4
On one hand, defendants' use of urban psychosis, television
intoxication, and black rage to support an argument of provocation
may be less controversial than it is in the insanity context because
provocation requires a lesser degree of mental disturbance and, also,
usually mitigates guilt rather than completely exculpating the
defendant. On the other hand, the use of these defense theories to
343. The Model Penal Code has expanded this category of mitigation, providing that
[A] homicide which would otherwise be murder is committed under the influence
of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable
explanation or excuse. The reasonableness of such explanation or excuse shall
be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the actor's situation under the
circumstances as he believes them to be.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(b) (1962).
344. Dressier also points out that diminished capacity claims may be subsumed under
the MPC's extreme mental or emotional disturbance rubric. DRESSLER, supra note 293,
at 325.
345. Delgado, supra note 5, at 51.
346. DRESSLER, supra note 293, at 481-82; LAFAvE & ScoTr, supra note 228, at 661-63.
347. LAFAVE & ScOTr, supra note 228, at 662.
348. State v. Hall, No. 60898, 1992 WL 181709, at *1, *6 (Ohio App. 8 Dist. July 30,
1992) (Harper, J., dissenting).
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support provocation may be more controversial to the extent that the
defendant's criminal conduct continues to be judged against an
objective, reasonable-person standard which excludes the very
information at the heart of these theories. However, if the doctrine
of provocation continues to evolve in the direction of including more
subjective considerations, such as the effects of social toxins, then
these three theories of defense may enjoy greater success349 in
elucidating the mental state necessary for provocation.350
3. Self-Defense: A Justification Defense
Defendants' use of urban psychosis, television intoxication, or
black rage to support a claim of self-defense is relatively rare; only
two cases discussed in Part I implicated this defense. In Osby,351 an
urban-survival-syndrome case, the defendant claimed self-defense in
his killing of two young men. In Lamar,352 a black-rage case, the
defendants asserted that they were acting in self-defense when they
assaulted police officers called to the scene of a high-school riot.353
Under Robinson's schema of defenses, the self-defense jus-
tification exists when the "harm is outweighed by the need to avoid
an even greater harm or to further a greater societal interest.' 31
Thus, for instance, when an individual kills in self-defense, that killing
is said to have been justified or correct conduct under the circumstan-
ces. A justification focuses on the act, while an excuse, such as the
insanity defense, focuses on the actor: "Acts are justified; actors are
excused. ,355
Without unpacking the entire self-defense doctrine, the major
issue associated with the utilization of the three defense theories to
support a claim of self-defense devolves upon the relevance of these
349. Only the dissenting opinions in Fisher and Hall gave much credence to the
provocation argument, although Taylor's offense may have been reduced on this theory.
350. Expert testimony may be useful in helping the jury to understand better the
defendant's mental state in terms of provocation. Walker and Monahan would
characterize this as social science used to provide context. Laurens Walker & John
Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559
(1987). McCord characterizes as traditional the use of social science (specifically
psychology) to substantiate mental states not amounting to insanity. McCord, supra note
305, at 23-24.
351. See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
352. State v. Lamar, 698 P.2d 735 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984); see supra notes 148-52 and
accompanying text.
353. Neither the defendants in Osby nor Lamar were acquitted based upon the defense
of self-defense, but Osby's first trial resulted in a hung jury. See supra 35-41.
354. Robinson, supra note 282, at 213.
355. Id. at 229.
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theories to the defendant's mental state at the time of the criminal
act. The general rule is that "the defendant's belief in the necessity
of using force to prevent harm to himself [must] be a reasonable
one,"35 6 and that reasonableness is judged by an objective stan-
dard.?5 7 However, "[i]ncreasingly, courts and statutes are 'subje-
ctivizing' the 'reasonable man'-i.e., infusing characteristics of the
defendant in the objective standard. 35 8
A good example of the increasing subjectivization of the
reasonable-person standard is People v. Goetz, 9 in which the court
held that the jury must determine the defendant's belief from a
reasonable person's perspective in light of the circumstances and
characteristics of the defendant 3 ° Goetz sought to explain his
shooting of four black youths in light of his history of muggings and
resultant mindset of heightened fear?6' Goetz's claim is strikingly
similar to that of Osby, 62 who maintained that he was acting under
heightened fear because of his experiences in a violent, urban
environment.3" Similarly, cases in which battered women assert
self-defense to justify their conduct often implicate the role of
subjective standards of reasonableness-a trend that has sparked
considerable criticism.
356. LAFAVE & ScoT, supra note 228, at 457. In the case of deadly force, the
defendant must reasonably believe that she was in imminent danger of serious bodily
injury or death when she killed the victim. Id. at 456.
357. "The traditional rule is that the 'reasonable person' is someone of ordinary
intelligence, temperament, and physical and mental attributes." DRESSLER, supra note
293, at 202. In contrast, the Model Penal Code requires only that the belief be subjectively
held by the defendant. The inquiry is simply whether "the actor believes that such force
is necessary to protect himself against death or serious bodily harm." MODEL PENAL
CODE § 3.04(2)(a)(ii)(3) (1962).
358. DRESSLER, supra note 293, at 202.
359. 497 N.E.2d 41 (N.Y. 1986).
360. Id at 52.
361. Id. at 44. For discussions of Goetz in terms of its racial overtones, see Stephen L.
Carter, When Victims Happen To Be Black, 97 YALE L.J 420,420-29 (1988); Tesner, supra
note 156, at 307-09; see also DRESSLER, supra note 293, at 203 (discussing the relation
between a defendant's "aberrational racial views" and the reasonable person test).
362. See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text. But cf Smith, supra note 5, at 484-
85 (eschewing the comparison of Goetz to a battered woman).
363. Delgado comments on the use of RSB to support a self-defense argument: "The
prevalence of violence in RSB neighborhoods, however, makes the possibility of having
to defend oneself very real. Because the ghetto-dweller is more sensitized to danger than
the average person, he or she is more likely to commit homicide or assault under mistaken
circumstances." Delgado, supra note 5, at 46.
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Defendants' use of the theories of urban psychosis, television
intoxication, and black rage to support a defense of self-defense 3"
is probably the most controversial application of these theories. As
Delgado points out, "self-defense poses the same question as does
provocation-what is reasonable?"36  The trend toward an
increasingly subjective standard of reasonableness, as exemplified in
Goetz and cases of battered women, however, suggests that these
defenses are not unique in explaining the defendant's behavior in
terms of the effects of social environmental factors, such as crime
victimization or physical abuse. These theories of defense fit within
existing trends in the evolution of self-defense doctrine.
B. Mitigation of Punishment
In the studied cases, a fourth general use of these theories of
defense was to determine the defendant's moral culpability at the time
of sentencing. In non-capital cases, the information encapsulated in
these theories may be used to determine the length of prison term,
eligibility for parole, or availability of a pardon."6 For example, in
Morgan,"7 defense counsel credited the introduction of information
about urban psychosis for the early parole date her client received.
In capital cases, the information may be relevant to the question of
whether the defendant's conduct merits the imposition of the death
penalty. In three cases, Long, Schiro, and Howard, the defendants
utilized information about the effects of media violence on their
364. In addition to the complete defense of self-defense, some states also recognize
"imperfect self-defense" as a form of mitigation, usually in the context of criminal
homicide. See DRESSLER, supra note 293, at 199 ("The partial defense is recognized if D
honestly but unreasonably believes that factual circumstances justify his use of defensive
deadly force."); LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 228, at 665-66. Thus, an individual like
Osby might be able to mitigate his crime from murder to manslaughter via the imperfect
self-defense doctrine. DRESSLER, supra note 293, at 199 and sources collected therein.
The doctrine of imperfect self-defense also raises the issue of mistake as a possible defense
in some of these cases, but is beyond the scope of the present analysis.
365. Delgado, supra note 5, at 46.
366. See Linda L. Ammons, Discretionary Justice: A Legal and Policy Analysis of a
Governor's Use of the Clemency Power in the Cases of Incarcerated Battered Women, 3 J.L.
& POL'Y 1, 53-78 (1994) (discussing battered woman's syndrome in the context of pardon
decisions); David P. Bancroft, Post Traumatic Stress Disorders, and Brainwashing as State
of Mind Defense in Criminal and Civil Fraud Cases, in CRIMINAL LAW AND URBAN
PROBLEMS 211 (1985) (PLI Litigation and Administrative Practice Course Handbook
Series No. C4-4174, 1985) (discussing PTSD as a mitigating factor in sentencing); Vuoso,
supra note 5, at 1661 (noting that severe environmental deprivation may be relevant to
sentencing, parole, and pardon decisions).
367. See supra notes 20-27 and accompanying text.
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criminal behavior to argue for mitigation instead of the death penal-
ty.368
The use of these defense theories as mitigation at sentencing is
the least controversial of the four general uses of this social science
information, because courts have traditionally considered the very
type of information that underlies these three defenses at that phase.
Even commentators opposed to the use of these defense theories as
complete defenses or as mitigation at the guilt phase have sanctioned
their use at the punishment phase.3 69
1. Non-Capital Cases
Perhaps the biggest challenge to the use of this information at
sentencing is the growing trend toward determinate sentencing and
the circumscription of judges' sentencing discretion. According to
Abbe Smith, director of the Criminal Justice Institute at Harvard Law
School, the sentencing phase was the point in the criminal justice
system at which the defendant could argue for compassion, but that
has changed with the advent of sentencing guidelines.
Extenuating circumstances-a history of abuse, a life-
threatening illness, alcoholism-were traditionally argued to
mitigate punishment, not guilt .... Later, that kind of
evidence was more limited at trial but allowed at sentencing
.... Nowadays ... judges are constricted by laws that
demand minimum mandatory sentences or establish firm
sentencing guidelines. As a result, most judges no longer
have the power to show compassion by giving a lesser
sentence. So ... arguments about terrible events in a
defendant's background are being made to the jury-to
mitigate guilt. You can't blame defense attorneys for trying
370
368. See supra notes 78-91 and accompanying text.
369. See, e.g., Bancroft, supra note 366, at 211 (discussing California's statute, which
explicitly permits judges to consider Vietnam PTSD in sentencing); Elizabeth J. Delgado,
Vietnam Stress Syndrome and the Criminal Defendant, 19 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 473, 508
(1985) (discussing middle-ground approach to veterans with PSTD "which lies somewhere
between abandoning those for whom the help came too late and bending the laws of
criminal responsibility beyond recognition."); Geraldine L. Brotherton, Note, Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder-Opening Pandora's Box?, 17 NEw ENG. L. REv. 91, 92 (1981)
(arguing that PTSD should be considered in sentence mitigation); see also Debra D. Burke
& Mary Anne Nixon, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and the Death Penalty, 38 How. L.J.
183, 198 (1994) (discussing PTSD as a death-penalty mitigator even if it fails to support
an insanity defense).
370. Dianna Marder, Defendants Test Limits in Making Excuses, PHILA. INQUIRER, Feb.
13, 1994, at D1.
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Similarly, a number of commentators have criticized the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines because they eliminate the consideration of a
number of factors in the sentencing decision, such as the race of the
defendant. Placido Gomez argues that there are two classes of cases
in which a judge should weigh the offender's race as a mitigating
factor under the guidelines: (1) cases of cultural uniqueness, and (2)
cases in which racial discrimination has tainted the criminal
process. 71 Charles Ogletree similarly comments: "In addition, to
help remedy the pervasive racial discrimination in our criminal justice
system, judges should be given discretion to take into account an
offender's race as a mitigating factor."3"
2. The Death Penalty
In contrast to the trend in non-capital cases, current death
penalty jurisprudence mandates the consideration of individualized
circumstances of the defendant's life. In its plurality opinion in
Lockett v. Ohio, 73 the United States Supreme Court held that
"[T]he sentencer ... [can] not be precluded from considering, as a
mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and
any of the circumstances of the offense."'374 Later, in Eddings v.
Oklahoma,375 a majority of the Court reaffirmed its holding in
Lockett and specifically emphasized the importance of mental state as
a mitigating factor: "[J]ust as the chronological age of a minor is
itself a relevant mitigating factor of great weight, so must the
371. Placido G. Gomez, The Dilemma of Difference: Race as a Sentencing Factor, 24
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 357, 360 (1994). Gomez writes that:
despite the laudable objective of limiting discretion and assuring neutral
treatment, the federal sentencing guidelines may at times create unfairness. They
destroy two traditional roles of sentencing judges-bridging cultural gaps and
compensating for prior racial bias-leaving a vacuum where previously at least
some judges were able to impose just and fair sentences.
Id. at 386.
372. Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion? Reflections on the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1938, 1960 (1988); see also Samuel L. Myers,
Jr., Racial Disparities in Sentencing: Can Sentencing Reforms Reduce Discrimination in
Punishment?, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 781 (1993) (discussing whether sentencing reforms have
eliminated racial disparity).
373. 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion).
374. Id. at 604.
375. 455 U.S. 104 (1982). In Eddings, the defendant emphasized his rotten social
background: " '[Eddings] also argues his mental state at the time of the murder. He
stresses his family history in saying he was suffering from severe psychological and
emotional disorders, and that the killing was in actuality an inevitable product of the way
he was raised.' " Id. at 109 (citations omitted).
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background and mental and emotional development of a youthful
defendant be duly considered in sentencing." '376 Thus, ironically, the
sentencer may be able to consider more information about the
defendant when imposing the death penalty than when determining
an appropriate jail term or parole date,3" even if the ultimate
decision is to sentence the defendant to death 78
C. Conclusion
The defense theories of urban psychosis, television intoxication,
and black rage may be accommodated within existing categories of
criminal defense and mitigation with little substantive innovation or
expansion. In the context of insanity and diminished capacity, these
theories of defense simply provide new causal explanations for mental
illness of varying degrees. With respect to provocation and self-
defense, the theories continue the trend toward the increasing
subjectivization of the reasonableness standard in both these contexts.
Finally, courts' use of the types of information upon which these
theories are premised at the time of sentencing is not unique or
unusual.
376. Id at 116; see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 322-28 (1989) (holding that
mitigating evidence of mental retardation and childhood abuse should be introduced and
heard by the sentencer in considering the death penalty); California v. Brown, 479 U.S.
538, 541 (1987) (holding that capital defendants generally must be allowed to introduce
relevant mitigating evidence regarding their character). To the extent that mitigating
evidence includes information about the defendant's mental state at the time she
committed the crime, the same type of information used at the guilt phase is relevant here.
To the extent that the mitigating evidence concerns the defendant's current mental status
or predictions about the defendant's mental health in the future, such as future
dangerousness, different issues arise.
377. In states in which mitigating evidence must fit within specific categories, such as
insanity or intoxication, the same issues will arise as discussed above. But, even in those
states, courts have considerable discretion to look at all evidence of mitigation. As the
Supreme Court stated in Johnson v. Texas, 113 S. Ct. 2658 (1993), although the sentencing
body cannot be prevented from considering all forms of mitigating factors, " 'States are
free to structure and shape consideration of mitigating evidence in an effort to achieve a
more rational and equitable administration of the death penalty.' " Id at 2660 (quoting
Franklin v. Synaugh, 108 S. Ct. 2320, 2331 (1988) (plurality opinion)).
378. All three defendants utilizing media violence as mitigation, Long, Schiro, and
Howard, were sentenced to death, although the jury in Howard was out for five days.
Munn, supra note 86, at 478; see supra notes 78-91 and accompanying text (discussing the
three cases).
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IV. SOME POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THESE DEFENSES FOR THE
EVOLUTION OF CRIMINAL LAW: DIFFERENTIAL IMPACT AND
LONG-TERM, DEVELOPMENTAL EXPLANATIONS OF CRIMINALITY
This Part addresses briefly some of the multifarious policy
implications engendered by the criminal defenses of urban psychosis,
television intoxication, and black rage, and the social science literature
upon which they are premised; these policy implications transcend
issues related to either the defenses' scientific merits or their potential
impact upon criminal doctrine. In addition to their common starting
point of emphasizing the role of social toxins such as real-life
violence, television violence, and racism, as causative factors in the
development of psychological dysfunction, these theories of defense
share two other characteristics with broad-ranging policy implications
for the evolution of criminal law: (1) differential impact, such that
only some individuals exposed to these social toxins are so adversely
affected that criminal conduct results, and (2) reliance upon long-
term, developmental explanations for the genesis of some criminal
behavior.
A. The Social Toxins of Real-Life Violence, Television Violence, and
Racism Differentially Affect Individuals
Although real-life violence, television violence, and racism are
pervasive and potent influences in our society, contributing sig-
nificantly to its overall social toxicity, these environmental factors
affect individuals differently.379 In the three areas of research
summarized in Part II, social scientists concluded that not all persons
exposed to these social toxins are damaged psychologically or develop
full-blown mental illness.8  Furthermore, even among those
individuals who are so affected, only some smaller percentage actually
commit criminal acts. Researchers have identified two sets of factors
in explaining why these social toxins differentially affect persons: (1)
379. To some extent, the plausibility of these defenses is enhanced by the fact that
these three social environmental factors are widespread, rather than trivial, influences in
our society.
380. See, e.g., Bowser, supra note 243, at 111 (noting that some blacks cope with racism
while others do not); Garbarino et al., supra note 184, at 378 (noting that not everyone
who is exposed to firsthand violence develops PTSD); Kolbert, supra note 217, at A13
(Gerbner's research on television violence suggests that , there are differential levels of
responsiveness); Resnick et al., supra note 177, at 429 (discussing vulnerability-stress
factors in development of PTSD); Spurlock, supra note 241, at 165 (noting that some
blacks cope with racism while others break down).
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characteristics of the toxins, such as level of exposure, and (2)
characteristics of the individual in terms of responsiveness.
While these three social toxins are pervasive, exposure to them
is not evenly distributed across the entire population. In fact, these
social toxins have an inordinate impact on some distinguishable
segments of society. Two of the theories of defense, urban psychosis
and black rage, are partially defined in terms of their application to
specific subgroups of the general population-modern urban dwellers
and racial minorities, respectively. In addition, some commentators
have suggested that the toxin of television violence predominantly
affects the poor. For instance, in her discussion of the impact of
media violence on real-life violence, former Surgeon -General Joycelyn
Elders commented: "We may not be talking about middle-class
children. We are talking about the poor children whom TV is raising,
if you will. They feel violence is a way of life, that it has no
consequence. They see they killed him today (on TV), but that he is
back tomorrow." '381 Thus, although the social toxins of real-life
violence, television violence, and racism negatively influence all
members of society, their impact may be more highly concentrated,
and thereby cause greater harm, in certain identifiable subgroups. '
Even within societal enclaves that are particularly inundated by
real-life violence, media violence, and racism, individuals differ in
their level of susceptibility or responsiveness to these toxic influences.
Social scientists have begun to identify certain risk or vulnerability
factors that offer some hope of sorting out who is most likely to be
381. "The President Doesn't Want a Rubber Stamp", NEWSDAY, Jan. 5, 1994, at 37; see
also Frontline, supra note 49 (stating that television is raising poor children).
382. Harry H. Wright & Elizabeth A. Cole, Black Children in Psychiatric Outpatient
Treatment in the United States, in MENTAL HEALTH IN AFRICA AND THE AMERICAS
TODAY 275, 276 (Samuel 0. Okpaku ed., 1991) ("Children growing up in stressful
environments are at a greater risk of developing emotional, behavioral, developmental, and
social problems than those in average environments. The poor and politically powerless
are particularly affected and black children are disproportionately represented in both of
those groups.") (citations omitted); cf. Delgado, supra note 5 (discussing the independent
defense theory of "rotten social background" as it pertains to certain definable classes of
society). I leave for another time the political implications of recognizing defenses
involving minority groups and politically powerless segments of society. In this connection,
some authors have suggested that defenses proffered by Vietnam veterans and battered
women were recognized in some measure based upon society's communal guilt over their
mistreatment-a politically-motivated response. See, e.g., Michael J. Davidson, Note, Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder: A Controversial Defense for Veterans of a Controversial War,
29 WM. & MARY L. REv. 415, 439 (1988); Nightline, supra note 8 (interviewing Professor
Patricia King who argued that society has ignored battering and is just beginning to
recognize it).
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affected by various social toxins." Unfortunately, the social science
literature is less helpful in predicting who will be affected by these
social toxins to the point of criminality. As a general matter, social
scientists are notoriously poor at making predictions of future violence
based on the types of factors involved in these cases.3"
The policy implications derived from the empirical fact that the
social toxins of real-life violence, television violence, and racism affect
members of society differently are threefold. First, these theories of
defense raise the question of some individuals' special vulnerability to
the effects of these social toxins. If the vast majority of citizens who
are exposed to the toxins in one form or another are not affected to
the point of mental illness, does this preclude a defendant who was so
affected from utilizing one of these three theories of defense?
Criminal law is premised upon the notion of assessing individual
culpability on a case-by-case basis. In any given case, then, the
inquiry is whether the particular defendant was damaged by the social
toxin to an extent cognizable under one of the doctrinal categories of
defense or mitigation discussed in Part III; the reaction of the
majority of other individuals to that social toxin is simply immaterial
to this inquiry. Thus, for example, the fact that a defendant was
driven insane by watching thousands of hours of violent television,
while most of us would not be, is irrelevant because we are only
interested in assessing the individual defendant's criminal respon-
sibility.
However, a deeply-embedded notion in the criminal law is that
we must be able to sort out those whose culpability differs from the
vast majority of citizens. This is the function performed by the
doctrinal categories of defense and mitigation discussed in the
previous section. For instance, in his discussion of excuse defenses,
Robinson notes: "[T]he disability serves to distinguish the defendant
from the general population. If the actor is perceived as clearly
abnormal, he can be spared condemnation and punishment without
undercutting the general condemnatory and deterrent functions of the
383. See, eg., Bowser, supra note 243, at 112 (discussing vulnerability to racism due to
lack of community support); Centerwall, supra note 217, at 3059-60 (discussing correlation
between age of initial television viewing and later violent activity); Garbarino, Growing
Up, supra note 10, at 7-8 (discussing the accumulation of risk factors). Similarly, a growing
body of research exists about the differential effects of PTSD. See supra notes 176-80 and
accompanying text.
384. See, e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880,896-903 (1983) (discussing psychiatrists'
inability to predict future dangerousness in the context of death penalty cases).
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criminal law.",3 5 Robinson continues: "Society, as represented by
the jury, must be convinced that the labelled disorder is severe
enough to distinguish the defendant., 386 In the final analysis, this
becomes a question of proof: can an individual defendant amass
sufficient evidence that a particular social toxic affected his conduct
to an extent not experienced by others?
A second policy implication deriving from the fact of differential
impact concerns the accuracy of apocalyptic predictions of the demise
of our criminal justice system because large segments of society will
be able to obviate criminal liability, based upon the alleged negative
effects of these social toxins. As a theoretical matter, these predic-
tions are simply not borne out by the relevant research literature since
only some individuals have a degree of mental impairment cognizable
under the criminal law. In addition, both the dearth of extant cases
in which defendants presented one of these defense theories and the
defenses' general failure to shield defendants from criminal liability
further underscore their limited impact on the criminal justice
system.3a 7 In short, recognition of these theories of defenses will not
open the floodgates to untold masses of defendants.
A third, and related, policy implication concerns the question of
whether these theories of defense will be abused because large
numbers of defendants will assert them without empirical merit. This
issue concerns the jury's ability, aided by expert testimony from social
scientists, to discern those who have been so adversely affected in
their mental functioning by these social toxins that their criminal
behavior is attributable to them.38 Yet this is precisely the function
of the criminal justice system. The possibility that these theories of
criminal defense may be abused should not preclude them from
consideration.
In summary, a fundamental tension exists between the notion of
individual responsibility for criminal conduct, a foundational premise
of criminal law, and the possibility that the defense theories of urban
psychosis, television intoxication, and black rage may obviate criminal
liability for large segments of our society. While the evolution of
criminal law always carries with it a seed of instability, recognition of
385. Robinson, supra note 282, at 226 (footnote omitted).
386. IAL at 227 n.96.
387. See supra part I.
388. Smith argues that jurors "should hear evidence of a defendant's 'rotten social
background' and decide for themselves whether it mitigates her culpability. They may
reject the evidence or accept it. Either way, it will be the jury's decision." Smith, supra
note 5, at 465 (citation omitted).
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these theories of defense is unlikely to result in the destabilization of
our criminal justice system. Only a discrete group of defendants will
actually be able to avail themselves of these defense theories.
Moreover, fundamental issues of fairness underlying the criminal
justice system mandate that defendants, with supportable theories of
defense, be allowed to "make their case" to a jury and receive
individualized consideration of their culpability rather than dismissing,
a priori, their claims.
B. The Need to Integrate Increasing Scientific Knowledge Regarding
the Causes of Criminal Behavior: Long-Term, Developmental
Explanations
Urban psychosis, television intoxication, and black rage as
theories of criminal defense contribute to the evolution of criminal
law by offering new and more sophisticated causal
explanations-grounded in increasing scientific knowledge about the
psychological consequences of a toxic social environment-of some
criminal behavior via the mediating construct of mental illness or
psychological dysfunction. These new causal explanations share two
significant features: (1) reliance upon long-term, and sometimes
diffuse, causal connections rather than more immediate ones, and (2)
implications, in these long-term explanations, for the developmental
processes of children.
First, the social toxins of real-life violence, television violence,
and racism affect individuals over time, causing long-term changes in
psychological functioning and behavior, just as air pollution or
cigarette smoking take their toll over the years. As social scientists
have pointed out, the consequences of these toxins require con-
sideration of long-term, rather than immediate, effects resulting from
exposure. For instance, Garbarino emphasizes the long-term mental
health effects of chronic exposure to real-life violence."8 9 Similarly,
exposure to television violence, especially at young ages, can produce
harmful lifelong problems."' 0 Finally, in the area of racism, it is
precisely the long-term effects of racism, and segregation, that
concerned the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education.39'
Second, these three social toxins significantly impair child-
developmental processes. As noted above, it is not a single exposure
389. Garbarino et al., supra note 184, at 378, also point to what they call "sleeper
effects" which occur at a later date. Id.
390. COMMISSION ON VIOLENCE AND YouTH, supra note 211, at 33.
391. 347 U.S. 483, 493-94 (1954).
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to these toxins that impairs psychological functioning and may result
in criminal behavior, but rather the repeated exposure to these toxins
over a protracted period of time. However, it is also more than mere
protracted exposure. These social toxins have deleterious consequen-
ces for children, who are especially vulnerable to them and who
eventually grow up and commit crimes as adolescents and adults.
In each area of social science summarized in Part II, researchers
have emphasized the inordinate impact of the social toxin on child-
developmental processes. Garbarino found that children exposed to
chronic real-life violence are developmentally impaired.3" Bigelow
similarly comments:
The inner-city children are victims of the conditions surroun-
ding them. They are not to blame, yet they are the ones
suffering. Many of these children suffer from a disorder that
has long-term consequences. Although they are children
today, they will be the adult members of our society in ten
to fifteen years. What tyj e of person will a child in this
environment grow to be?3 9
The majority of social science research on television violence has
focused on its effects on children.394 Researchers have concluded
that the effects of television violence usually appear many years after
initial exposure begins.395
Given that homicide is primarily an adult activity, if
television exerts its behavior-modifying effects primarily on
children, the initial 'television generation' would have had to
age 10 to 15 years before they would have been old enough
to affect the homicide rate. If this were so, it would be
expected that, as the initial television generation grew up,
rates of serious violence would first begin to rise among
children, then several years later it would begin to rise
among adolescents, then still later among young adults, and
so on. And that is what is observed. 6
Social scientists have also discovered that while racism causes
mental health problems for individuals of all ages, its most profound
effects are on children.397
392. Garbarino et al., supra note 184, at 378-80.
393. Bigelow, supra note 200, at 547-48.
394. See supra part II.B.
395. Centerwall, supra note 217, at 3061.
396. Id.
397. See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 264, at 142 ("Finally, and perhaps most disturbingly,
racism and racial labeling have an even greater impact on children than on adults.").
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[I]n terms of mental health, racism is a more pervasive and
a far more serious threat than childhood schizophrenia,
mental retardation, psychoneurosis, and any other emotional
derangement. Its destructive effects severely cripple the
growth and development of millions of our citizens, both
young and old alike. Yearly, it directly and indirectly causes
more fatalities, disabilities, and economic loss than any other
single factor.398
The effects suggested by the social science literature are borne
out by the cases. Many of the cases reviewed in Part I involved
youthful offenders or implicated child-developmental processes. In
the urban-psychosis cases, all but one of the defendants were between
seventeen and nineteen years of age.399 In the four cases involving
violent television or rock lyrics, the defendants were between fifteen
and nineteen years old.' Also, the defendant in one of the por-
nography cases reportedly began watching violent pornography at the
age of six." In the black rage context, the defendants were not all
youthful, but developmental processes were implicated in several of
the cases: Freeman was jailed at sixteen,' Murdock grew up in the
depressed Watts section of Los Angeles, 3 and Gilchrist perceived
racism throughout his educational and occupational career.4"
What are the implications of this aspect of the social science
literature? As currently framed, much of criminal doctrine is
premised on a fairly tight connection between the cause of the
behavior and the resulting criminal conduct. These three theories
suggest that the causal window should be expanded to include more
longitudinal views of criminality. For example, in order to understand
the impact of television violence on criminal behavior, the question
398. Spurlock, supra note 246, at 161 (quoting from The Joint Commission on the
Mental Health of Children).
399. Morgan was seventeen, Taylor was thirty, Connelly was nineteen, Osby was
eighteen, and Boney was nineteen. See supra 20-45 and accompanying text.
400. Zamora was fifteen, Molina was twenty-one and his accomplice was sixteen,
Quillen was seventeen, and Howard was nineteen. See supra 46-77, 86-91 and accom-
panying text.
401. Schiro v. Clark, 963 F.2d 962 (7th Cir. 1992). Schiro's defense counsel argued that
his client's " 'premature exposure to pornography and continual use with more violent
forms created ... a person who no longer distinguishes between violence and rape, or
violence and sex.' " Id at 972; see supra 81-85 and accompanying text.
402. Tilove, supra note 97, at 10A.
403. United States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923, 958 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, J.,
dissenting), cert denied, 409 U.S. 1044 (1972).
404. Defense: Gilchrist Felt "Exploited," supra note 156; see supra 153-61 and
accompanying text.
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should not be whether viewing one television program caused the
defendant to kill.' Rather, the inquiry should be whether the
cumulative impact of watching ten years of violent television
significantly contributed to the defendant's mental state and his
criminal behavior. A more expansive perspective is necessary to
understand better effects that are impossible to detect in the short-
run.
In summary, if the criminal law restricts itself to the consideration
of only short-term causal explanations for criminal behavior, it will
miss the rich contribution these theories of defense can make by
elucidating more diffuse and long-term pathogenic factors in criminal
behavior. As Judge Bazelon observed:
[W]e sacrifice a great deal by discouraging Murdock's
responsibility defense. If we could remove the practical
impediments to the free flow of information we might begin
to learn something about the causes of crime. We might
discover, for example, that there is a significant causal
relationship between violent criminal behavior and a "rotten
social background."'
Furthermore, only by integrating our increasing scientific knowledge
about these long-term detrimental influences on psychological
functioning can the criminal law keep pace with the realities of
modern living.
C. Conclusion
On one hand, the costs to the criminal justice system of recog-
nizing the defense theories of urban psychosis, television intoxication,
and black rage are relatively minimal since only a small percentage of
criminal defendants will be able to avail themselves of these new
theories. On the other hand, the potential benefits of their recog-
405. An example of this problem can be seen in Zamora. See supra notes 46-67 and
accompanying text. On voir dire, the trial judge asked the expert the following question:
"In any of your tests, in any scientific journal that you have read, have you ever
conclusively linked any particular television program or amount of television violence
directly to a homicide?" MONAHAN & WALKER, supra note 56, at 452. When the expert
answered in the negative, her testimony was excluded. Id. Similarly, Campbell, in writing
about tort actions based on the noxious quality of television violence, comments: "Social
scientific studies often ask whether exposure leads to general aggressive tendencies.
However, the relevant legal question is whether any specific incident viewed on television
actually and proximately causes a criminal act." Campbell, supra note 66, at 430. Framed
in this manner, the answer will always be in the negative, except perhaps in cases of
imitative violence.
406. Alexander, 471 F.2d at 965 (Bazelon, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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nition are significant because these theories offer increasing
knowledge about causes of some criminal behavior that have been not
been elucidated to date.
CONCLUSION
We cannot rationally decry crime and brutality and racial
animosity without at the same time struggling to enhance the
fairness and integrity of the criminal justice system. That
system has first-line responsibility for probing and coping
with these complex problems.'
Acid rain, ozone depletion, the greenhouse ef-
fect--environmentalists are warning us that our physical milieu is
becoming increasingly polluted and toxic. But the physical environ-
ment is not the only one suffering from degradation. Social scientists
are beginning to document that our social environment is also
becoming increasingly toxic to members of our society. Three of the
most pervasive and noxious components of this social toxicity are real-
life violence, media violence, and racism.
The consequences of the increasing toxicity of our social
environment are less noticeable than rivers on fire, the results of acid
rain, or the clouds of smog hanging over major industrial cities. The
effects of social toxins are reflected in the human component of our
society, taking the form of developmental impairment and
psychological, psychiatric, and medical damage to the citizenry. As
one author wrote about the devastating effects of real-life violence but
with equal applicability to other social toxins: "Chronic violence in
the community permeates every aspect of these children's lives,
affecting their families, their education and their sense of self, hence
also affecting what type of citizen they will mature into. "408
407. Id. at 926. In one attorney's words: " 'It is frequently the legal cases that cause
people to move forward in their thinking.' " Shoop, supra note 9, at 13 (quoting Felicia
Morgan's attorney, Robin Shellow). But see Nightline, supra note 8 (Professor King
opined: "I think that the message we should draw is that we should not dump all of
society's problems on the criminal justice system, which is where they end up if we don't
tackle them in other places.").
408. Bigelow, supra note 200, at 567 (emphasis added); see also Smith, supra note 5, at
462 (noting that poor urban youth are "this nation's future"); Marilyn Garateix, "We Share
in Their Agony," Priest Says, MIAMI HERALD, July 27, 1993, at 3BR ("Ewing [one of the
experts in Morgan] believes current social and economic conditions are contributing factors
to the rise of juvenile homicides. Among them: Increased divorce, child abuse, media
violence and a breakdown in institutions that used to instill values.").
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The criminal justice system, in the guise of defendants' presen-
tation of new theories of defense such as urban psychosis, television
intoxication, and black rage, and those that are sure to follow, will be
asked to accommodate increasing knowledge about the toxicity of the
social environment and its psychological sequelae within the context
of established criminal law doctrine. These theories of defense
demand thoughtful, reasoned consideration commensurate with the
importance and complexity of the challenges which they pose for the
evolution of criminal law.
Law is not a static entity, numbly frozen in time and divorced
from the current realities of modem life. Law must continue to
evolve in response to the changing world in which it functions. As
Holmes commented, "The life of the law has not been logic: it has
been experience."4 9  Legal evolution requires the integration of
information coming from other bodies of knowledge, including the
social sciences. As Justice Murphy observed fifty years ago in United
States v. Fisher: "[T]hese claims, whatever their merit, afford a rare
opportunity to explore some of the frontiers of criminal law, frontiers
that are slowly but undeniably expanding under the impact of our
increasing knowledge of psychology and psychiatry.'4 ° The defense
theories of urban psychosis, television intoxication, and black rage are
on the current frontiers of the criminal law. Recognition of their
importance and their fit within the existing doctrinal structure is
recognition of a changing society and its sometimes deleterious effects
on the human psyche.
409. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
410. 328 U.S. at 491 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
HeinOnline  -- 74 N.C. L. Rev.  811 1995-1996
HeinOnline  -- 74 N.C. L. Rev.  812 1995-1996
